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This thesis makes use of the little studied records of 
the Military Stores or Ordnance, Department during the 
American Revolution to examine the commonly held assumption 
that the Continental Army was inadequately supplied with the 
materials necessary for waging war. The evidence suggests 
that contrary to this assumption, the Ordnance Department, 
following the reforms of 1778, kept the army well supplied 
with military stores. 
This study will examine three phases which illustrate 
the evolution of the Ordnance Department and the Army as a 
whole. The first phase, 1775-1777, illustrates the extempo-
rized approach to war waged by Congressional committees 
lacking in military knowledge and experience. From 1777 to 
1779, we witness the maturation and professionalism that 
evolved following the failure of the old colonial, citizen-
militia approach to war. The final phase, 1779-1783, 
provides the evidence that the professionalization worked. 
Under the guidance of General Henry Knox and the 
leadership of its two wartime administrators, Benjamin 
Flower and samuel Hodgdon, the Ordnance Department, like the 
2 
army it supported, evolved into a complex and sophisticated 
organization. Under Knox and Hodgdon, the Department grew 
from a divided and unresponsive system under political 
controls imposed by Congress into an efficient organization 
responsive to the army's needs. In many ways, the Depart-
ment became superior to the British system upon which it was 
initially based and, except for spot shortages arising from 
poor fiscal or political planning and transportation 
problems, the Department kept the army well supplied with 
the weaponry and military stores needed for victory. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION--DR. FRANKLIN'S ROD 
Many years after the successful completion of the 
American War for Independence, John Adams, in a letter to 
Dr. Benjamin Rush of Philadelphia, said, "the history of our 
revolution will be one continued lie ••• the essence ••• will be 
that Dr. Franklin's electrical rod smote the earth and out 
sprang General Washington. That Franklin electrified him 
with this rod--and thence forward these two conducted all 
the policy, negotiations, legislatures and war . .,l While it 
is difficult for us today to gauge the seriousness of Mr. 
Adams' remark, it nevertheless has value in illustrating one 
interpretation of that great struggle. This thesis will 
examine a specific aspect of the military history of the 
revolution: how the combat infantryman was equipped to 
carry on that struggle. These men, the Continental 
regulars, formed the core of Washington's army. They toiled 
and fought for eight years against a foe that many have held 
to be the greatest military power of their age. Did Dr. 
Franklin's rod or some analogous tool play a part in their 
struggle? 
To place this thesis in its proper context, we must 
discuss the state of military history and the historiography 
of the revolutionary war as it stands today. Military 
history has normally fallen into four categories or topical 
fields of study, often woven together by writers into a 
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single view. The simplest type is the combat chronicle. 
These studies generally relate a chronological narrative of 
military operations from the outbreak of war to the 
cessation of hostilities--a "who did what to whom and when" 
approach. Occasionally, some critique or analysis is 
attempted, but it is not made central to the study. A 
second, more sophisticated approach to military history 
examines war on a strategic level. These studies, usually 
associated with national war college-type training of 
potential military leaders, examine war within a politico-
military arena--a "why they did it" analysis, rather than 
the blow-by-blow combat chronicle. A third category centers 
around military biography as a major field of study. This 
approach uses the "great captain" as a vehicle with which to 
examine the course of a particular conflict. It can rise 
above the combat chronicle approach and operate on a 
strategic level, but its primary aim is to incorporate the 
human element, the effect of personality, into the war. Our 
final category would be a structural analysis of military 
history, the study of administration, organization, and 
doctrinal factors and the internal impacts they make on war. 
These studies are primarily logistical in context, the 
military-industrial complex if you will, examining the 
economic-technologic basis of war--a "what they could do" 
approach. This same method could also take an external 
view, placing war within an ideological-societal context or 
a type of "great crusade." It is primarily within this 
3 
fourth category, the examination of administration and 
I 
logistics, that this thesis falls. 
It is important to recognize certain basic trends in 
the historiography of the revolutionary war. 2 From the time 
that the musket smoke first cleared until well into the 
present century, historians have channeled their work into 
what is basically a "who won--who lost" approach to the 
revolutionary war. Initially addressed in the writings of 
actual participants and by later workers using their letters 
and diaries, these relatively simple studies sought either 
to bestow praise or to fix or escape blame. These efforts 
are illustrated by the works that British generals such as 
Sir Henry Clinton and John Burgoyne, wrote to defend their 
actions and careers during political inquiries, and by 
civilians such as David Ramsay and Charles Stedman who 
sought to explain away the loss of the first British Empire 
by blaming British blunders, lack of a grand strategy, and 
political corruption and despotism. 
On the American side, autobiographies disguised as 
general histories such as those by Generals James Wilkinson 
and William Heath and by Colonel "Light Horse Harry" Lee, 
sought to depict how their own glorious and praiseworthy 
struggles against an overpowering opponent won the war for 
America. The "ancestor worship" approach typified by Parson 
Weems, that placed all the gods and heroes on our side, was 
not far behind. Even late nineteenth century writers' works 
such as William Stryker and Henry Johnston, while producing 
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sound and still valuable studies, had not progressed beyond 
the "who won--who lost" basic combat narrative, non-
analytical approach. 
By the twentieth century we begin to see a shift in the 
study of military history. Military professionals such as 
Britain's Major General J.F.C. Fuller and America's Major 
General Francis v. Greene began to pay more attention to the 
methodology and critical analysis of war, a topic ignored by 
historians working in the political and economic sectors 
then in vogue. The World War II era, especially, produced 
work by historians either hired by the military or who had 
personal military experiences during a period of world 
conflict on an unprecedented scale. The need for combined 
operations, i.e., amphibious war, and the impacts of total 
national mobilization reflecting a need to understand and 
overcome economic, military, and technologic problems, 
produced studies by George A. Billias, Samuel E. Morison, 
and William B. Wilcox of a new genre, beyond the old "drum 
and bugle" combat narratives of previous writers. 
Vietnam and the social activism of the late 1960's and 
early '70's, however, produced the most radical change in 
the study of military history. The nature of the conflict 
in southeast Asia produced a deeper set of questions than 
most military historians and the armed forces themselves 
ever had to grapple with. American political and military 
leaders had to define limited military objectives within the 
broader context of political and ideological conflict. How 
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to protect a friendly population while attempting to win 
over, neutralize, or control a hostile one, fight both a 
guerilla and conventional war, and at the same time 
establish an effective local and national government were 
questions seldom before addressed. How were military and 
political doctrines, methodology, and organization to be 
meshed in formulating strategy? 
The questions of Vietnam developed a "new" military 
history and historian. They developed the need to place the 
study of armies and war within the broader perspectives of 
political, economic, technological and social history and 
analysis. The best examples of this "new" approach can be 
seen in the work of scholars like John Shy, who has examined 
the role of the revolutionary militia, finding them most 
effective not as a "big battle" combat force but as a 
political weapon used to suppress loyalists and maintain 
political control once the main army had moved on: by 
Charles Royster, who has taken a cue from the politico-
ideological school typified by Bernard Bailyn and examined 
the social and ideological base of the war effort or, as he 
phrases it, the "spirit of '75." 
This is not to say that the armies and battles side of 
military history has been supplanted, but it has been cast 
in a "new" light. Works by Robert K. Wright, Jr., H.A. 
Houlding, and Don Higginbotham have pointed out the 
importance of 
administration 
understanding military doctrine, 










combat performance. Logistical 
in Britain, by Arthur Bowler, 
David Syrett, and Marvin Van Creveld have shown the 
importance of supply, the unglamorous and painstakingly 
detailed requirements of bread, buttons, and bullets, 
without which the grandest strategy, the most brilliant 
tactics, and the greatest commanders would all come to 
nought. 
While these "new" approaches to military history have 
shown us how incomplete a knowledge we have of the 
revolutionary war, they have developed several common 
threads. First, a viable and effective militia had to be 
placed and maintained in the field in order to serve as an 
auxiliary to the Continental Army and to provide political 
control in its absence. Second, political decisions and 
considerations impinged on military decisions: to what 
degree could either side use Indians and loyalists, for 
example; could the age-old practice of impressment be used 
by a people contending for freedom from overbearing 
authority; what were to be the chief strategic and tactical 
objectives, e.g., whether towns and crops were to be 
destroyed in order to deny their use to the enemy, and what 
was required to reach those objectives? Third, that the 
British were able to undertake their greatest war effort to 
date, but that they were handicapped by communication, 
logistical, and organizational problems. The British 
military efficiency so familiar to the historian of 
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Victorian and later periods has been shown to be only 
apparently so during the eighteenth century. Fourth, we 
have come to recognize that war was in the mainstream of 
18th century life and development. Indeed, the period has 
been characterized by some as being one of almost continued 
warfare interrupted by occasional outbreaks of peace. 
Finally, the American colonists were not totally unfamiliar 
with military developments. The concept of the Leg ion, a 
military force of combined arms such as infantry and cavalry 
designed for flexibility and speed, developed by French 
military theorists and soldiers such as Marshal Saxe, was 
adopted by British commanders in America such as John Forbes 
and Henry Bouquet during the French and Indian war. 
Concepts like these were not lost on young Americans like 
George Washington, who were fortunate enough to see theory 
put into practice, and Henry Knox, who read military works 
as a personal interest. 
One further factor is readily observed to be missing 
from our list of theoretical concepts. Ronald Hoffman has 
pointed out that current scholarship has been directed at 
" ••• the most basic of questions--who was going to fight the 
war and for what?" 3 This thesis will ask a further 
question--how? 
During the decades immediately following world War II, 
military historians such as Erna Risch and James Hutson 
examined the logistical aspects of the revolutionary war in 
a rather narrow fashion, from the "top down." Basically, 
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they examined the legislative and political developments of 
the war as reflected by the views of the Continental 
Congress and the army's commander, General George 
washington. Their general evaluation was a negative one. 
They took Washington's constant plea for more of everything 
as representing the total failure of every supply function 
in the army. There is a possibility that this "top down" 
view obscures qualifying details. Would it not be 
unreasonable to see washington in the same light as any 
other army commander? No general in history has thought 
that he ever had enough of anything--men, swords, guns, or 
missiles. While these arguments may be true in specific 
instances, they can also tend to serve as an escape clause 
for failure. A general cannot reasonably be blamed for 
defeat if he is not given the necessary resources. 
Washington may also have used a common bureaucratic tactic: 
intentionally asking for more than you need in the hopes 
that higher headquarters will give you someting. 
In the 1970's, however, historians like Jesse Lemisch 
have recommended looking at history from the "bottom up. " 4 
David Salay has taken this approach in the field of 
logistics in his study of how Pennsylvania armed itself for 
war by examining artisans and production. Martin Van 
creveld, by studying 150 years of military logistics and the 
course of campaigns, has pointed out the need for detailed 
studies of supply, studies necessary before the theoretical, 
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macro-cosmic interpretations of history can take root. He 
has argued, for example, that the generalizers attribute the 
German failure in Africa during 1942-43 to a chronic supply 
shortage, and then let the issue drop. 
" ... no author has yet bothered to 
But Creveld argues, 
investigated such 
questions as the number of lorries the Africa Corps had at 
its disposal or the quantity of supplies those lorries could 
carry over a given distance in a given period of time ••• " or 
the fact that the generalizers who criticized and condemned 
the German Schieffen Plan of 1914 never considered the 
"consumption and requirements of the German armies ••• without 
even a look at a detailed railway map." Without these 
specific studies, 
on shaky ground. 
This thesis 
micro-examination 
the generalizers and cosmic thinkers are 
will attempt such a fine-scale study, a 
of one segment of the logistical system, 
the Ordnance or Military Stores Department. Specifically, 
it will examine the basic working level--how the Commissary 
General of the Military Stores Department supplied the main 
Continental Army with the basic infantry equipment necessary 
for battle--through an analysis of material previously 
omitted from systematic and quantitative study, i.e., the 
ledger books of Samuel Hodgdon (Commissary General of 
Military Stores during the second half of the revolutionary 
war) , and the Miscellaneous Numbered Records of the 
Revolutionary War (Record Group 93 in the National 
Archives). As recent scholarship has tended to replace the 
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old "rag, tag, and bobtail" image of the Continental Army 
with a new competent and thoroughly professional military 
image, so too will this thesis argue that the old image of 
the "rag, tag, and bobtail" Continental Army, at least from 
the point of view of military or ordnance stores, may be in 
need of revision. 5 These records appear to have been 
ignored by researchers because of the great difficulty they 
present in working as a result of their seemingly chaotic 
nature of arrangement. Too often, materials on the 1780-81 
phase of the war, are inter-mixed with those from the 1775-
76 period. The records are also often undated, unsigned, 
and almost unindexed. But with slow and systematic study of 
particular areas, a suggestive image does begin to appear, 
an image that is contrary to many of the old images 
previously mentioned. 
This thesis will examine the infantryman's basic 
equipment--muskets, bayonets, cartridge boxes, bayonet belts 
and scabbards, and musket cartridges. 6 The muskets 
available in the eighteenth century could cause bewildering 
problems to supply officers. British, French, Spanish and 
Dutch regulation military weapons and civilian arms were all 
of differing calibers. The mixture of weapons like these 
caused supply nightmares. Even as late as Valley Forge, 
washington had to order units to exchange weapons in the 
hope that at least each company would have a uniform 
. t. . t 7 ammun1 10n requ1remen • 
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Bayonets, like all objects in that time, were handmade, 
so they were not interchangeable with muskets, even of the 
so-called national regulation patterns. Each bayonet had to 
be fitted to one individual musket and was so marked. They 
might not fit another. 
Leather gear, such as bayonet belts and scabbards, and 
cartridge boxes was indispensible to the soldier. The 
scabbards protected the bayonet from the elements and from 
loss, and allowed the soldier to safety carry it so as to 
not injure himself or his comrades. 
army was so critically short of 
washington had to order the troops 
constantly fixed to their muskets, 
the loss of many of the weapons. 
Early in the war, the 
bayonet scabbards that 
to carry their bayonets 
a practice that led to 
Cartridge boxes held a prescribed number of rounds of 
ammunition, usually 40, in some degree of safety from 
breakage and the elements. The cartridge, being a musket 
ball and its powder charge wrapped in a paper container, was 
easily destroyed by moisture. Indeed, in some cases such as 
the "Battle of the Clouds," fought during the defensive 
campaign for Philadelphia in 1777, combat had to be stopped 
by both sides because a sudden downpour of rain rendered the 
ammunition supply on both sides useless. 
The artillery, while less critical to this study of the 
infantry, faced similar equipment difficulties. The mixed 
bag of American artillery used during the war caused 
ammunition problems, again because of different gun 
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calibers. French ammunition could not be used readily with 
British cannon and vice versa. A cannonball that was too 
big for its gun was obviously not practical, but one too 
small was equally bad if not deadly. A small ball left too 
large of a gap between itself and the bore of the cannon. 
If this gap, called windage, was excessive, the ball would 
cause uneven wear along the bore. The wear would then 
result in a loss of accuracy, the potential for short rounds 
falling among friendly forces, and possibly the ultimate 
destruction of the cannon itself. Other types of equipment 
such as that used by the cavalry, engineers, and the navy 
are so specialized as to be beyond the scope of this study 
and will not be addressed. 
This study, then, will be an examination of the 
operation of the Military Stores Department during the 
Revolution and its ability to supply the Continental Army 
directly under Washington. It will test whether foreign 
influences, so prevalent in colonial America, had any 
bearing on the development and operation of that Department. 
Finally, it will examine the degree to which the role of 
personality and regulation played in the Department's 
operation. While merely a footnote to the greater 
historiography of the revolutionary war, this thesis may 
suggest the need to re-evaluate many of the old generali-
zations and assumptions regarding the Continental Army. It 
may be a test of the myth of Dr. Franklin's rod or evidence 
of the reality of dedication and the work of men. 
13 
In this study, eighteenth century spelling and 




THE AMERICAN CONTINENTAL ARMY 
When the Continental Congress adopted the heterogeneous 
force beseiging the British in Boston as the "American 
Continental Army" it inherited the responsibility to 
organize and supply a force which eventually numbered almost 
20,000 men by the summer of 1775. 8 Many in Congress, like 
John Adams, worried about this responsibility. "It is a 
vast and complicated System of Business," Adams noted, 
" ••• and we were all of us, unexperienced in it." 9 
The French and Indian War, 1755-1763, had given at 
least some Americans a peripheral exposure to the British 
army. Some, like George Washington and Israel Putnam, had 
campaigned alongside British professionals in the 
wilderness. Others, like Eliphalet Dyer and Roger Sherman, 
contracted to furnish them with supplies . 10 Through this 
exposure, Americans gained some familiarity with the 
operations of the British army, and an insight into its 
strengths and weaknesses. Congress naturally used this 
experience to pattern the Continental Army after the 
British, but hoped to improve upon the British system. One 
of the first organizational tasks Congress faced was the 
need to acquire military supplies, particularly weapons. 
America initially lacked the military-industrial base to 
produce large amounts of arms, forcing Congress immediately 
to begin importing military stores. 
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On April 19, 1775, the war of words between England and 
her American colonies became a war of bullets. The 
Americans faced seemingly overwhelming odds. England 
reigned as the foremost military and naval power in the 
world, with an apparently unified and experienced 
administrative, organizational, and industrial base. The 
thirteen rebellious colonies, on the other hand, were 
composed of a loose confederation of separate and self-
interested states, without a navy to guard their shores and 
bring in supplies; without a single professional soldier or 
an army to turn back the foe; and without the economic means 
to wage war. Few Americans had commanded large units in 
battle or had any specific experience organizing, equipping, 
and maintaining an army numbering in the tens of thousands. 
An equally serious handicap came from the fact that weapons 
were produced by a cottage industry. For over a century 
this approach had sufficed to supply the colonists with arms 
for hunting and Indian defense, but it could not meet the 
demands of a large-scale war. 
Before the first clash of arms, many colonial leaders 
feared that the complex political crises between themselves 
and Great Britain might end in conflict. Some colonies 
began military training, strengthened their militia 
organizations, and, despite a British ban on importation, 
began to acquire arms and other military stores. The 
British attempt to seize or destroy munitions stockpiled at 
concord precipitated armed confrontation. 
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Meeting in Philadelphia, Congress responded to the news 
of Lexington by creating a committee to investigate ways and 
means of obtaining arms and military stores. The members of 
the Committee, George Washington, Philip Schuyler, Thomas 
Mifflin, Lewis Morris, Silas Deane, and Samuel Adams, 
provided a blend of talent and experience. Washington and 
Schuyler were the two delegates in Congress with the most 
military experience. Mifflin, Morris, and Deane were 
merchants and were expected to provide insight into the 
acquisition and distribution of materiel. It is not clear 
why Adams was selected but it may have been related to 
regional or party interests in Congress. 11 
It is obvious that Americans turned to the British Army 
when they set up their own military organization. The 
colonists borrowed much from Europe, especially Britain. 
Political ideologies and structures, religious beliefs, and 
cultural mores from across the Atlantic were modified to 
suit the "new world" experiences and needs. In this context 
it was quite natural for Americans to borrow their military 
institutions from the British as well, especially after 
having seen that army first hand since 1755. 12 
At the time of the American Revolutionary war, the 
British army was not the efficient, smoothly operating 
military machine popular history suggests. Scarcely a 
century old at the Battle of Lexington, the British regular 
or standing army was, in reality, little more than a 
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collection of regiments. These regiments, composed of ten 
companies totaling nearly five hundred men, were under the 
almost autonomous control of their Colonel. In peacetime, 
the Colonel had nearly independent authority over the 
administration, training, and supply of the regiment. While 
regulations or royal warrants prescribed standard uniforms 
and equipment, the Colonel used the governmental funds 
allocated to him for the regiment as he saw fit. If he 
could obtain cheaper quality uniforms and equipment, then 
that was so much more extra money in his pocket. 13 In 
wartime, the regiments, under the command of their 
Lieutenant Colonels [aristocratic Colonels almost never went 
to war], would be grouped together under a temporary field 
commander for some particular campaign. 
Administratively, the King sat at the top of the 
British military and naval establishment. Unless he was 
particularly interested in military affairs, the King 
normally let the Privy Council and the Cabinet establish 
policy and strategy, subject to his final approval. 
Effective direction came from one of three Secretaries of 
State responsible for particular geographical areas such as 
the colonies. They issued the orders implementing the 
chosen policy to the Admiralty, Treasury, Ordnance, and 
Army. All overseas operations involved the Admiralty which 
provided transports, storeships, victuallers, and escort 
14 vessels. 
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Army supervision fell to the Secretary at War. The 
Secretary did not sit as a member of the Cabinet and had no 
direct responsibility for policy or strategy. His duties 
were limited to such tasks as preparing cost estimates, 
furnishing statistical information to the King and 
Parliament, and handling internal army matters such as 
promotions, resignations, marching orders, and courts 
martial. In these activities, however, he was limited to 
the army in England and Scotland (the British Establishment) 
which was directly funded by Parliament. Troops in Ireland 
(the Irish Establishment) were funded by the Irish 
Parliament and were under the direction of the Lord 
Lieutenant of Ireland. Operational control of the army was 
handled by the Privy Council, Cabinet and the Secretaries of 
State. 15 
The army had little organizational unity. In addition 
to the separation between the British and Irish 
Establishments, infantry and cavalry forces (the line or 
marching regiments), were distinct from the engineers and 
artillery. The latter were administered by the Board of 
Ordnance and not by the Secretary at War. They were the 
only troops provided with technical and professional 
military training and received a higher rate of pay than the 
marching regiments. Men, pay, arms, clothing, provisions, 
transportation, and sea power were all a host of separate 
"commands 11 or departments under the control of political 
appointees who often looked first to their own interests 
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rather than that of their charges. These latter items, 
commonly known today under the term "logistics," are the 
focus of this study and so warrant further description. 
Logistics has been defined as "the practical act of 
moving armies •.. providing for the successive arrival of 
convoys of supplies ••• and establishing and organizing ..• 
lines of supplies." 16 Like the standing British army, 
logistics, while not then known by that name, was a 
relatively new concept. Prior to the mid-seventeenth 
century, armies maintained themselves while on campaign by 
impressment and plunder, eating their way from one objective 
to the next. The relatively small armies of the period had 
little need for lines of communication or supply. By the 
late seventeenth century, however, armies had grown to such 
size and complexity that detailed planning was necessary to 
procure, store, transport, and issue the supplies necessary 
for a hundred thousand men or more. 17 
The British supply system of 1775 suffered from the 
same divisions and lack of centralization as the rest of the 
army. secretary at War, Charles Jenkinson, often complained 
that he could not get accurate returns from commanders in 
America. Without this information no one knew what supplies 
to send. The plea "For Go~'s sake send us money, men, and 
provisions, or expect nothing" applied to both British and 
American forces. The divided responsibilities in British 
organization and strategy led Sir John Fortescue, a noted 
British army historian, to call the system "a hopeless 
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organization for War ••• " characterized by "overlap, dupli-
cation and decentralization." 18 
The British supply system must share some of the blame 
for the loss of America. If the army could not obtain 
supplies, it could not hold ground; if it could not hold 
ground, it could never conquer. The lack of food and fuel 
often produced redcoats as hungry and cold as their American 
foes. Shortages of materiel seriously hampered British 
operations. British gunpowder and flints were known to be 
defective and the "Brown Bess," the standard British 
infantry musket, had many weaknesses . 19 In the fight for 
New York in 1776, the lack of camp equipment allegedly kept 
General William Howe from moving against Washington as fast 
as he wished, giving the rebels a few additional weeks to 
improve defenses. Howe again suffered from this problem in 
1777. In 1780, General Henry Clinton, who succeeded Howe as 
Commander of British forces in America, blamed his 
inactivity in part on an "acute" powder shortage. He stated 
that the troops did not have enough powder to permit their 
exercises at arms and that the British even had to stop 
firing salutes. In the South, British operations were 
hampered by a lack of cavalry equipment. They were also 
forced to disarm loyalist militia in New York in order to 
obtain weapons for the southern campaign. One historian has 
recently suggested that the inability of the British to arm 
the loyalists was one of the factors in their loss of the 
south. British regiments returning home after the war had 
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equipment so worn out as to be beyond repair and nearly 
useless for service. But even early in the war these 
problems existed. Regiments taking part in the attack on 
Bunker Hill had muskets so worn out that they had to be 
issued new arms on the morning of the assault. Many of the 
Boston garrison regiments were still using breakable wooden 
ramrods in muskets which should have been replaced by steel 
l h lf t 1 . 20 ones near y a a cen ury ear 1er. 
One of the culprits in the failure of the British 
supply system and the department directly responsible for 
arms, ammunition, and military stores was the Board of 
Ordnance. The Board of Ordnance was under the operational 
control of the Master General of the Ordnance. At the start 
of the Revolution, the Master General was the Right 
Honorable George Viscount Townshend. The Board took its 
orders directly from the King, Privy Council, or the 
Secretaries of State, and not from the Commander-in-Chief or 
the Secretary at War. The Board was divided into two 
branches. The Civil Branch under Townshend handled all the 
acquisition, preparation, and issue of stores. A Military 
Branch, which also reported to Townshend through the Chief 
Engineer, was responsible for the military engineering 
functions of the army such as road construction and 
fortification. The Board also administered a company of 
artificers, skilled military or civilian technicians, who 
performed repair or construction duties. The company did 
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not serve in America, however, the work there being done 
under contract. 21 
The Board met in the Ordnance Office at Westminster 
where the sub-officials handled the business. The Master 
General had five assistants. The Lieutenant General served 
as the adjutant to the Master General of the Ordnance. A 
Surveyor General examined the quantity and quality of all 
stores received, noting issues and receipts. The Clerk of 
the Ordnance kept all records and accounts for cash and 
stores and drew up the estimates. A Principal Storekeeper 
was custodian of the ordnance stores received into and 
issued out of the tower. The Clerk of Deliveries kept the 
accounts of the issues of stores and ordnance. Finally, a 
Paymaster-Treasurer was also assigned to the staff. Each 
garrison town had a storekeeper and a number of clerks who 
were responsible for the troops billeted there. The Board 
issued stores only on the orders of the King, Privy Council, 
or Secretaries of State. 
The Board's primary duties were to supply the arms and 
ammunition of the army, regulate the inspection of arms and 
accouterments, and direct the royal artillery and engineers. 
The Board kept its own records and accounts and was funded 
independently of the army commanders. 22 The Board also 
operated the Academy at Woolwich that trained officers for 
the artillery and engineers in mathematics, gunnery, 
fortification, and other technical subjects. These officers 
were regarded, and regarded themselves, as an elite group 
23 
and looked down upon their comrades in the marching army. 
The Board also operated its own ships for transporting 
artillerymen and ordnance stores but had to apply to the 
Victualling Board, a subsidiary of the Admiralty, for food 
while at sea. 23 
The Board of Ordnance was tainted by scandal during the 
Seven Years War for issuing poor arms, faulty equipment, and 
bad ammunition. It was excessively frugal, issuing 
equipment or performing repairs only at the last minute, and 
was slow even then. The Board jealously guarded its 
authority and conflicts led the marching army to regard it 
as-incompetent, "obnoxious and obstructive." 24 
This flawed institution became Congress' model in 1775. 
Americans reprinted standard British military manuals such 
as Simes' Military Guide, and Bland's Military Discipline, 
washington, particularly, recommending the latter to his 
officers. Most of the New England militia used a manual 
written by Colonel Timothy Pickering of Massachusetts which 
b d B . t . I N f lk . . 1' 25 he ase on r1 a1n s or o D1sc1p 1ne. Ex-British 
officers such as Charles Lee and Horatio Gates were 
initially held in high respect, even by Washington, and 
placed in high positions where they used their British army 
experience to help mold and organize the American Army. 26 
With little experience in running an army, Congress had much 
to do and learn. 
On June 14, 1775, Congress adopted the motley band of 
separate New England forces before Boston as "the American 
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Continental Army." It established the first regular 
enlistments [ten companies of riflemen] and set up a 
committee to draft rules and regulations "for the government 
of the army." The next day, it appointed George Washington 
Commander-in-Chief, and subsequently began establishing 
embryonic staff departments for the army. Drawing upon 
British precedent, Congress authorized the appointment of a 
Quartermaster General, Adjutant General, Paymaster General, 
Commissary of Musters and a Commissary General, leaving the 
actual appointments to be made by Washington. 27 
Arriving in Cambridge in July, 1775, Washington began 
the task of organizing his army and making key appointments 
in its various departments. Ezekiel Cheever, a 
Massachusetts artillery officer, was appointed Commissary of 
Artillery stores. Cheever was responsible for receiving, 
storing, and issuing all ordnance stores. He apparently 
held this position until assigned to the laboratory at 
Springfield, Massachusetts, in 1777. Thomas Mifflin, a 
prosperous Philadelphia merchant, and, like Washington, a 
recent Congressman, was appointed Quartermaster General. 
Like his British counterpart, Mifflin's duties included 
gathering intelligence, supplying camp equipment, forage, 
provisions, wagons, boats, lumber, fire wood and other 
necessities of an army in the field. 
While Washington toiled in Cambridge Congress did 
likewise in Philadelphia. 28 American infantry regiments 
emerged with approximately the same size and shape as their 
25 
British counterparts. Congress adopted a modified version 
of the British Army's Articles of War which set out the 
legal regulations of the army. A medical department, based 
on the British system, was established. Congress also set 
up military departments based on geographical divisions by 
initially appointing General Philip Schuyler to command the 
forces gathering along the North or Hudson's River. 
Eventually the colonies would be divided into six geographic 
departments, each with their own supply officers and 
29 depots. See Map 1. 
Having provided a basic army organization modeled on 
the British system, Congress next turned to specific problem 
areas: One of the most pressing concerns was the need for 
weapons and ammunition. Colonies like Massachusetts and 
Pennsylvania had accumulated over 42,000 muskets by early 
1776 but more were needed. By 1777, the colonies had 
produced only about one-third (2, 290,877 pounds) of their 
gunpowder requirements. 30 Anticipating problems, on 
September 18, 1775, Congress appointed a nine-member "Secret 
committee of Trade" to import 500 tons of gunpowder, 40 six-
pounder brass cannon, up to 20,000 double briddled musket 
locks and 10,000 stand of good arms. The committee was also 
to see to the distribution of these stores upon their 
. 1 31 arr1va • By the end of 1775, Congress also attempted to 
standardize domestic arms production. Gunsmiths received 
instructions to copy the "Brown Bess" musket, but also to 
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weapon's deficiencies. For example, the "Committee of 
Safety" muskets were required to have the more reliable and 
durable steel ramrods. 32 
Problems related to the actual shortages of supplies 
were compounded by administrative problems created by 
Congress itself. Congress was reluctant to centralize 
political and military power. Regional jealousy, party or 
factional interests, and Whig ideology were among the 
factors that contributed to the diffusion of power and 
h . 33 aut or1ty. This led Congress to conduct its business 
through special committees. Whenever a crisis loomed or an 
unexpected problem arose, Congress created a cornmi ttee to 
deal with it. There soon came to be Cannon, Musket, 
Clothing, Medical, Marine, etc. committees, all competing 
for scarce resources. In addition, State governments raised 
and equipped their own land and naval forces further 
aggravating supply problems. This compounded Washington's 
organizational problems. Reluctance to consolidate power 
and the ignorance of the delegates regarding the real nature 
of army staff work led Congress astray. Fears of military 
dictatorship prevented the concentration of authority 
necessary for administrative responsibility. John Adams, 
for example, fought against allowing Washington to choose 
his own staff, arguing that it was "against every proper 
Rule and Principle ••. as these officers are checks upon the 
General, and he a check upon them: 
too much connection between them." 34 
There ought not to be 
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Lastly, the soldiers themselves and staff inefficiency 
or inexperience contributed to the supply difficulties. In 
1775 men followed colonial traditions and reported to camp 
with their own arms and ammunition. Those who came empty 
handed were issued what was available from stores or sent 
home. When discharged, they often took their weapons home 
with them. General George Weedon complained that the 
militia acquired arms from the government 11 by hook or by 
crook... It was a kind of common law amongst them to filch 
arms. 11 Citizens stole goods from army wagons or picked up 
arms left along the road leading General Nathanael Greene to 
state 11 It being a received opinion among many that whatever 
public property shall by accident or otherwise fall in their 
way, they have a right to apply to their own use. Thousands 
of arms and all kinds of public stores have been conveyed 
away upon this principle. n 35 Military stores were often 
misdirected or incorrectly stated in army returns {when 
those documents were even prepared). Headquarters, 
frustrated, tried to cope with the need to protect, store, 
repair and account for military stores. 
By the end of 1775 it was obvious that something had to 
be done to strengthen the administration of the new 
Continental Army. Spring could be expected to bring renewed 
British military activity. The military organization that 
congress had established based upon colonial experience and 
the familiar British system was badly flawed. The division 
of responsibility that characterized the British approach to 
war and a strong Whig 
handicapped the Americans. 
29 
political ideology in Congress 
Congress needed to find some way 
to bring scattered responsibility and a war by committee 
approach under greater control and direction. 
30 
CHAPTER III 
A NEW AND GREAT EVENT 
American hopes for a short struggle and a speedy 
reconciliation with Great Britain ended by the summer of 
1776. The British had decided to use force against the 
colonies and dispatched the greatest overseas army they had 
ever assembled. The inexperienced Continental Army was 
soundly defeated in a series of battles in New York and 
driven across New Jersey into Pennsylvania. Philadelphia, 
the seat of the Continental Congress, appeared lost by 
December and the specter of the gallows loomed before rebel 
leaders. Hopes fostered by the brave and noble words of the 
Declaration of Independence and the "rage militaire" of 1775 
began to pale before the bayonets of British and German 
regulars. 36 Congress realized that the struggle had now 
entered into a larger and more complex phase that dwarfed 
the extemporized approach to war of 1775. Without a 
stronger and better organized army, the Declaration would 
soon ring hollow. Political rhetoric and ideology had to 
give way to military necessity. 
The lack of fixed responsibility and accountability 
created chaos in the military supply operations of the war's 
first year. The acquisition and distribution of military 
supplies by the Secret Committee of Trade lacked efficiency. 
committee agents, such as John Langdon in Portsmouth, New 
Hampshire, received and disbursed the imported arms with no 
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strategic plans in mind and often without input from 
Congress or Washington. Lack of communication and 
accountability resulted in no one ever being sure of exactly 
what stores existed, when they were, and what had been 
issued to whom. In order to provide better control of this 
situation Congress appointed a seven member committee on 
January 23, 1776, to consider the feasibility of 
establishing a "War Office." 37 
In June, 1776, the committee submitted its report and 
Congress voted to establish a "Board of war and Ordnance." 
Congress sought to improve upon the British Board of War by 
combining many of the diverse and separate British military 
supply functions under one department. Army administration, 
promotion, provisions, troop registers, etc. were now to be 
centralized in the American system. In particular, and 
central to this thesis, Congress instructed the Board to 
obtain and maintain exact accounts of all artillery, arms, 
ammunition and warlike stores, to keep aware of where these 
stores were deposited, and to see to their preservation and 
care. The Board also supervised the raising of new troops, 
military expenditures, and the forwarding of dispatches from 
Congress to the armies in the field. 38 It was also directed 
to develop a plan of operai tons for the campaign of 1777. 
The Secreat Committee of Trade was directed to deliver all 
arms and military stores to the new Board which was to 
distribute them to the various geographic departments. 39 
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Congress attempted to consolidate many of the 
responsibilities scattered among various departments in the 
British army, such as the Secretary at War, the Board of 
Ordnance, the Privy Council and Cabinet, under its new Board 
of war and Ordnance. Congress hoped that this would achieve 
the efficiency lacking in the British system. 
Unfortunately, Congress did not go far enough. It did not 
give the Board authority over all the army's supply 
departments. 
The new Board of war was to consist of five members of 
Congress; Roger Sherman, Benjamin Harrison, James Wilson, 
Edward Rutledge, and John Adams, who was to serve as its 
first President. Richard Peters, a Philadelphia militia 
officer like Mifflin, was appointed Secretary. 40 While 
outwardly appearing to be just another congressional 
committee, the Board of War and Ordnance was to grow into an 
administrative link and clearinghouse between Congress and 
the Army. Writing to inform Washington of the new Board, 
President John Hancock called the action "a new and great 
event in the history of America." 41 
Meeting in its office in Market Street near the corner 
of Fourth in Philadelphia, the new Board worked day and 
night in order to solve the many problems facing the 
Continental Army. 
42 While new members were added and old 
ones left, the work seemed to produce little ill feeling 
among the members. Writing to Joseph Ward, a fellow 
Massachusetts delegate, Adams noted much "Candor and Harmony 
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exists between members as generally takes place in 
assemblies, and much more than could naturally be expected 
in such an assembly as this." 43 In the zeal of those early 
days the army people met frequently with those of the navy, 
loaning each other cannon, ammunition and other stores. 44 
Adams later characterized the burden of his task when he 
wrote: "The duties of this board kept me in continual 
employment, not to say drudgery from the 12th of June, 1776, 
till the 11th of November, 1777, when I left Congress 
forever. Not only my mornings and evenings were filled up 
with the crowd of business ••• but a great part of my time in 
Congress was engaged in making, explaining, and justifying 
our reports and proceedings." 45 
Having looked into the supply issue, Congress next 
turned its attention to the reform of the army. The large 
scale increases in British troop strength in 1776 called for 
an American army on a larger footing than at Boston, and 
Congress wanted an army at least twice the size of the 
British. 46 Fear of a large standing army and belief in the 
republican virtue of the militia or citizen soldier led 
Congress initially to provide for only one year enlistments. 
By the time of the battles of New York, washington's forces 
numbered about 31,000 men, 57% of these being militia. 4 7 
The disasters in New York, however, showed the folly of 
depending upon militia units which could not stand the 
disciplined charges of the British and German regulars. By 
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the end of 1776 even John Adams had to admit that "a regular 
Army, and the most masterly Discipline" was needed. 48 
In the fall of 1776 then, based upon recommendations of 
the Board of War, Congress passed what was to become known 
as the "eight-eight battalion resolve." The army's strength 
was to be increased to 88 regiments or battalions [these 
terms were used interchangeably during this period], with 
soldiers enlisted for three years. Congress deliberately 
chose to relieve the militia of the responsibility to meet 
European regulars in open battle except under crisis 
conditions. By the end of 1776, Congress increased the 
number of desired regiments to 110 and included two 
companies of artillery artificers for repair work. 49 
Having established the Board of War to control and 
coordinate the affairs of the army and having laid out the 
organizational scheme of that army, Congress now got down to 
the issue of ordnance and military stores. Writing to 
Congress in September, 1776, Colonel Henry Knox, 
Washington's chief of artillery, offered a list of "Hints" 
or proposals to increase the efficiency of the artillery 
branch. 5° Knox asked for the establishment of magazines, at 
a safe distance from the front, to prepare and store 
ordnance supplies. He wanted military artificers assigned 
to the magazines to manufacture the vehicles, harnesses, and 
ammunition needed by the army. Foundaries would be set up 
for casting cannon, mortars, and howitzers, and an academy 
similar to the British school at Woolwich to train artillery 
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officers. Most importantly [for this thesis], Knox also 
asked for "a board of ordnance" for artillery and artillery 
stores "whose business shall be the regulation and 
management of the affairs of this department [the artillery] 
and to whom returns shall be made." 51 Knox envisioned this 
Board as being separate from the politically appointed Board 
of war and Ordnance just established by Congress. He did 
not elaborate on the expected membership of his Board nor 
did he explain how it would relate functionally to Congress. 
Not all of Knox's requests were instituted. This may 
be due to the lingering reluctance to centralized authority 
by Congress. Curbing the power of the military Congress 
kept the army under civilian control. It may have resulted 
from the confusion caused by Congress' flight to Baltimore 
in the fall of 1776 and the press of more important matters. 
Whatever the reason for rejecting Knox's total scheme, 
Congress did act to establish military store depots at 
Springfield, Massachusetts, and Carlisle, Pennsylvania. It 
also approved the establishment of military and civilian 
artificers. 52 
By the end of 1776 a professional military organization 
began to emerge. The increasing scope and complexity of the 
war showed Congress that dependence upon hastily assembled, 
untrained militia and improvised supply efforts could not 
produce victory. Commitments made in the political process 
through the Declaration of Independence were matched in the 
military sphere by the establishment of the Board of war and 
L 
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the recognition of the need for a long-term professional 
army. Congress' bold decision to rely on a long-term war 
machine faced a serious test in the complex campaigns of 
1777. While the expanded Continental Army, with militia 
support, won a major victory at Saratoga, it failed to hold 
Philadelphia and suffered many minor defeats. Poor 
battlefield performance wsa followed by near collapse in 
logistical support agencies. 
The need to provide military or ordnance stores for the 
larger army and long-term war now envisioned led to the 
establishment of a new department in the army's supply 
services--the Commissary General of Military Stores. In 
January, 1777, Washington appointed Lieutenant Colonel 
Benjamin Flower to head the new department. 53 Flower's 
duties were to erect magazines, laboratories, and foundries 
to fix ammunition, cast cannon, and prepare military or 
ordnance stores. His artificer companies were to make 
carriages for the artillery and harnesses. What Flower 
could not make he was to contract for. Washington urged 
Flower to speed up the production of gun carriages, the 
preparation of ammunition and the casting of cannon at 
Philadelphia. Flower was to apply to Congress for funds and 
on matters relating to camp business he was to work through 
General Knox and the Quartermaster General. "The speedy 
accomplishment of the matters with which you are instructed" 
washington told Flower, "are of such high import to the 
welfare of the Continent, that I hope no inducement will be 
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wanting to urge you to complete them as soon as possible." 54 
In April, 1777, Congress gave Flower his first appropr i-
ation, $100,000, and the Department was officially in 
. 55 operat1on. 
Following Flower's appointment as Commissary General of 
Military Stores, Congress moved to establish regulations for 
the Department's operations. The first problem it tackled 
wsa the lack of accurate information on the location and 
quantity of ordnance stores. By August, 1777, Congress 
ordered that the Commander-in-Chief and each continental 
district commander furnish monthly reports to the Adjutant 
or Deputy Adjutant General of all public arms and 
accouterments and all military stores. The reports were to 
be forwarded to the Board of war and Ordnance outlining the 
quanti ties of supplies and the corps to which they belong. 
Under threat of dismissal, all persons entrusted with the 
care of military stores were to make monthly returns to the 
Board giving the quantity and. condition of each article and 
. 1 . 56 1ts ocat1on. 
Congress also established regulations to deal with a 
second problem--the tendency of soldiers to keep their 
weapons after discharge. In January and February 1 17771 
congress ordered that all arms and accouterments belonging 
to the government be stamped and marked "UNITED STATES." 
The Board of War modified these instructions by shortening 
the mar kings to read "U: STATES." Upon receiving word of 
this Washington ordered Flower to have the stamps sent to 
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Samuel French, Commissary of Military Stores with the main 
army then at Morristown, New Jersey. 57 
Congress also moved to correct a third problem--the 
confusion relating to the accountability for and issue of 
military stores. Congress had earlier directed the Secret 
Committee of Trade to turn over all its arms supply 
responsibility to the Board of War and Ordnance. The 
difficulties of eighteenth century communication must have 
caused delay in the transfer of these duties because 
accountability problems still existed. In a further attempt 
to correct this problem, Congress now ordered that the 
Secret Committee of Trade could not authorize its agents to 
deliver stores 
Congress. 58 
in their custody except by Order of 
But even these reforms were not enough. The problems 
facing the Continental Army in 1777 were not restricted to 
supplies alone and the changes Congress instituted above did 
not work. By the end of 1777, the war effort was again near 
collapse. Continental currency began to depreciate rapidly. 
Quartermaster General Mifflin resigned in November after 
having ignored his responsibilities for several months and 
the office remained vacant during a critical part of the 
campaign. To make matters worse, the winter quarters 
selected for the main army at Valley Forge fell into an area 
that had been picked clean by both sides during the 1777 
campaign. That winter nearly 3, 000 men out of 17,000 were 
unfit for duty because they lacked shoes and clothing. For 
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days at a time, foodstuffs, particularly meat, were not to 
be had. Nearly 3,000 men were to die that winter of disease 
made worse by lack of food, clothes, shelter, and medical 
supplies. To save themselves because the army could not 
help them, soldiers subjected the surrounding areas to 
"plunder" and "abuses" for "three miles in every direction." 
Foraging expeditions were seen by one soldier as little more 
"than to procure provisions from the inhabitants ••• at the 
point of the bayonet." Writing to Congress that winter, 
washington said that if supplies were not soon available, 
the army would starve, dissolve or disperse. 59 
The Ordnance Department was no better off than that of 
the Quartermaster. A Congressional committee sent to camp 
to investigate conditions described the Department as being 
in the "most deplorable situation," with at least 6,000 arms 
being in need of repair. The lack of transport waggons, a 
responsibility of the Quartermaster Department, prevented 
ordnance stores from being moved and the deplorable road 
conditions forced the waggons that were available to carry 
only two-thirds of their normal load. Sometimes supplies 
even had to be dropped along the wayside where they became 
subject to plunder. Militia demands also drew down the 
stocks in the magazines, and the fighting in Pennsylvania 
had hopelessly mixed up the Pennsylvania State and the 
Continental stores so that Flower, to make amends, was 
forced to supply State demands. 60 General Baron Johann 
dekalb, one of the many French officers who volunteered in 
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America's cause, ably summed up the situation, " ••• luckily 
we have an enemy to deal with as clumsy as ourselves, ••• " 
otherwise, "all things seem to contribute to the ruin of our 
cause. If it is sustained, it can only be by a special 
interposition of Providence."6l 
Recognizing the need for reform in late 1777, Congress 
turned its attention to the Board of War. The Board was 
responsible for the receipt, issue, and maintenance of 
military stores and the records relating to them. The Board 
created in 1776 was composed of members of Congress. These 
overworked individuals simply could not devote enough time 
to solve every problem. Robert Morris realized this when he 
wrote, "the fact is they [Congress] have too many objects 
and retain too much executive business in their own 
hands." 62 
War. 
on October 17, 1777, Congress created a new Board of 
Congress expected this reform to provide experienced, 
full-time administrators. It elected an impressive group of 
members: General Thomas Mifflin, former Quartermaster 
General; General Horatio Gates, ,the hero of Saratoga with 
higher aspirations; Joseph Trumbull, Commissary General; 
Richard Peters, Secretary to the old Board of War; and 
Timothy Pickering, future Quartermaster General. Congress 
also increased the responsibilities of the Board by 
assigning it the additional duties of military recruiting 
and the construction and management of military buildings. 63 
on paper, the Board looked like a great mix of expertise. 
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Mifflin, Pickering and Gates were soldiers and were expected 
to provide guidance in military affairs. Trumbull had an 
excellent record in the Commissary Department and Peters 
could provide political and historical insight from his 
experience on the old Board of War. A great deal must 
certainly have been expected from all this talent. 
The Board was to prove a major disappointment, however. 
washington's performance in the campaign of 1777 and the 
loss of Philadelphia displeased many in Congress. Horatio 
Gates, however, was crowned with laurels. Some in Congress 
thought that Gates might produce the victory that Washington 
missed and rumors soon spread that there was a movement in 
Congress to replace Washington. Mifflin became implicated 
as a partner of Gates and the whole affair has come down in 
history as the Conway Cabal [named after General Thomas 
Conway, a French volunteer and friend of Gates]. Although 
the question of a plot or 'cabal' to replace Washington 
remains hotly debated by historians, the basic mood of the 
Valley Forge winter was a negative one: the Main Army 
suspected the Board of harboring ill-will for Washington, 
and therefore treated it with hostility. 
Faced with the inadequacy of their earlier reforms, 
Congress tried again. In early January, 1778, Congress 
dispatched to Washington's camp a Committee composed of 
delegates Francis Dana, Joseph Reed, Nathaniel Folsom, John 
Harvie [Charles Carroll of Carrollton and Gouvermeur Morris 
were to join them later], and Gates, Mifflin and Pickering 
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from the Board of War. The Committee was to investigate the 
condition of the army and make recommendations for the 
improvements they might find necessary. 64 Because of the 
political poison that arose between Gates, Mifflin and 
Washington, the members of the Board of War withdrew from 
the Committee. By this action the Board eventually removed 
themselves from any meaningful future role as directors of 
military policy and supervision. Washington's deep distrust 
of the Board, because of Gates and Mifflin, would lead him, 
with the assistance of Knox and Greene, to carry out more 
and more of the supply operations for the army under his own 
control. It would also cause Washington and Knox to turn 
away from Colonel Flower who held close friendships with 
Mifflin, Pickering, and Peters throughout the war. 
By the time of Valley Forge many problems beset the 
Army. The Officer Corps became convulsed over issues of 
rank and honor. French volunteers had offered their 
services to American agents in France. Their services were 
accepted in the hopes that their experience and knowledge 
would shore-up weak points in the Continental Army. The 
high rank they were given, however, enraged American-born 
officers who had carried the fight these past years. Many, 
like Knox, threatened to resign when they perceived their 
honor threatened by their being outranked by foreign 
. t 65 appo1n ees. 
The Committee concentrated, however, on two more 
important issues, the numerical weakness of the army and the 
,., 
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deterioration of the supply system. After three years of 
seemingly unsuccessful war, patriotic fervor rapidly cooled. 
Congress was finally forced to recognize that the large 
scale army it hoped to recruit in 1775 and 1776 would not 
materialize. In May, 1778 then, Congress acted upon the 
Committee recommendation to re-organize the army. It 
reduced the number of planned infantry regiments to eighty 
and reduced the number of men in each. 66 The army would now 
be a leaner and more compact force. On the supply side, 
Major General Nathanael Greene, one of Washington's most 
efficient and trusted officers, was prevailed upon to assume 
the duties of Quartermaster General. Greene soon had 
sufficient food and supplies coming in to Valley Forge to 
end the immediate crises. 
For the purposes of this thesis, Congress' most 
important work was with the Military Stores or Ordnance 
Department. In February, 1778, Congress drew up the first 
large scale operating regulations for the Department. 67 The 
new regulations spelled out exact procedures for the 
operations of the Ordnance Department, replacing the 
patchwork system of 1775-1777. Flower, as Commissary 
General of Military Stores, answered directly to the Board 
of war. He was responsible for the receipt, repair, and 
delivery of all arms, ammunition, accouterments, other 
military stores, and contracts. His accounts were to be 
audited every six months by the Board of Treasury. He was 





states, submitting status reports on the first of each month 
to the Board of War. The Board was required, from "time to 
time," to transmit these totals and the locations of 
military stores to Washington. Congress allowed Flower to 
appoint as many clerks, conductors, deputies, or assistants 
as he required. This was a major concession since Congress 
had denied this privilege to other staff departments such as 
the Commissary General, Joseph Trumbull, in the 
reorganization of 1777. 68 Unlike the Quartermaster 
Department, Flower's staff who did the purchasing of 
military stores were apparently allowed no commissions on 
their transactions since Congress considered commissions as 
a source of corruption and profiteering. 69 
Like other staff departments, the Military Stores 
Department was composed of a mixture of civilian and 
military personnel. Flower had the direction of all 
artificers and armorers employed in any armory, laboratory, 
or magazine, except those with the field army. The eldest 
colonel of artillery in camp, the chief engineer, or the 
commanding officer of artillery were to constitute a 
separate Board of Ordnance to transact all business 
necessary to be done in the field. They were subject to 
control by washington but not Flower. Flower was, however, 
to obey their direction in cases of emergency. 70 The 
artillery artifices were expanded from the two companies 
authorized in 1777 to a regiment of five. The pay of those 
who enlisted for three years or the war was set at $20 per 
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month, compared to $6-2/3 and $8-1/3 for the infantry and 
artillery private respectively, paralleling British army 
practice where technicians received higher pay than line 
troops. They also received the bounty, clothing and other 
benefits due to the Continental artillery. The officers' 
pay was to be equal to their counterparts rank in the 
artillery but they would have no rank or authority beyond 
their regiment. 
By spring then, Congress had prepared a new structure 
for the army and its supply department. The commencement of 
the campaign of 1778 prevented the reforms from being fully 
implemented, but this was to prove a blessing in disguise as 
fundamental problems in the Military Stores Department were 
uncovered. The February, 1778, regulations provided that 
returns of stores would be sent to Flower and that the Board 
of War would "from time to time" send the compiled data on 
to Washington and Knox. In reality what was to be "from 
time to time" became more akin to whenever the Board felt 
like it. By splitting the Department's responsibilities 
between Flower's staff and the field army, Congress created 
the potential for political conflict and operational 
inefficiency. Flower was answerable to the Board of War. 
The Board's leaders, however, Gates and Mifflin, had 
incurred washington's distrust as a result of the Conway 
cabal, and the poisonous political atmosphere this created 
enveloped Flower. The split had also resulted in 
operational inefficiency because Washington and Knox could 
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not obtain information on the quantity and location of 
ordnance stores during the campaign. This prevented 
effective planning and maneuver. 
In a bitter letter to Washington in December, 1778, 
Knox blasted the existing condition. The February 
regulation, he charged, had given the Board of War sole 
direction of all preparations of ordnance and military 
stores for the field and deprived him [Knox] as "Head of the 
Ordnance Department" of any direction over it except in 
emergencies. Knox felt that while Flower's reputation would 
be little damaged by stores "being improperly or ignorantly 
prepared," Knox said that his own would be ruined because he 
was answerable for the artillery stores. Knox complained 
that he could get no returns and did not know where to find 
ordnance stores and stated his "utter inability" to perform 
his duties. Flower's deputies gave him no information, "not 
conceiving themselves obliged to send me returns, even on my 
sending for them." His requests had gone unanswered for 
months and he found himself "totally ignorant of what is 
doing in the Ordnance Department in Pennsylvania." It is a 
"preposterous arrangement" Knox wrote, "where the Principal 
of a Department has not the sole direction of everything in 
it." Knox concluded that if Congress would not give him 
sufficient power "incidental to the Office" and if all the 
artificers, laboratory Directors, Commissaries, Clerks and 
Conductors in the Department could not be put under his 
h ld 
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47 
Knox had expressed similar views on the structure of 
the Ordnance Department in his "Hints" of 1776. Knox's 
personal ambition and the problems outlined relating to the 
campaign of 1777 and 1778, strengthened his efforts to 
gather all ordnance functions under himself, in effect 
making him the equivalent to Britain's Master General of the 
Ordnance, but with the control and responsibility over 
actual combat operations that the former figure lacked. The 
departmental regulations of 1778 showed that Congress either 
disagreed with him or did not understand Knox's 1776 
proposals. The upshot was an administrative nightmare in 
which two independent ordnance departments were created. 
One subject to the political control of a distrusted and 
politically motivated Board of War with no love of 
Washington, and the other limited to field expediency. Knox 
could not tolerate the fact that the Board of War had direct 
control of the very heart of the army's ordnance supply, the 
army's fate. 
Knox continued to press his case. In January, 1779, 
Washington sent him to Philadelphia to confer with Congress. 
Knox's criticism unfairly singled out Flower, but the 1778 
arrangement stated that it was the Board of War, and not 
Flower that was to provide the ordnance returns, and on no 
set schedule. Flower may have felt himself constrained to 
operate through prescribed channels. Flower's service 
through 1777 and 1778 had also been an immensely trying 




Stores but also Commander of the Artificer Regiment. The 
fall of Philadelphia launched him on a hectic tour of 
evacuating the military stores, relocating them through New 
Jersey and Pennsylvania. This kept him constantly traveling 
to supervise his scattered department. His health finally 
broke down at Valley Forge and he lay near death for weeks. 
Circumstance and Congress had forced Flower, alone, to carry 
the burdens that Knox had planned for a Board. 
In February, 1779, Congress worked out a compromise 
with Knox in the form of new regulations for the Ordnance 
Department. While Knox still did not receive the complete 
control that he wanted, the new system was an improvement. 
Knox received control over all ordnance activities in the 
field. While the Board of War, except in emergencies, still 
retained control over the stores in fixed magazines, it was 
now required to make monthly returns to the Commander-in-
Chief, who would then notify the Commander of Artillery. 
Knox's authority increased in two additional ways. He could 
influence production of military stores by sending the Board 
estimates of arms and other stores needed by the army, and 
also order changes in the construction or manufacture of 
ordnance stores. If the Board concurred, the artificers and 
laboratory personnel would comply. 
Knox's authority was further enhanced by the 
appointment of two officials: a Field Commissary of 
Military Stores 1 independent of Flower 1 was funded by the 
Commander-in-Chief. The Field Commissary, a member of 
49 
Knox 1 s staff I was to receive and issue all ordnance stores 
and arms in the field. He was also authorized to apply for 
and receive ordnance and other stores from the fixed 
magazines, accepting "none apparently unfit for service." 
Those items not repairable in the field would be sent to the 
Commissary General of Military Stores." The second official 
was to be a Surveyor of Ordnance. The Surveyor was to be 
selected from among the Colonels of Knox 1 s artillery 
regiments. He was to visit all production facilities and 
report on all matters of construction and quality control 
relating to ordnance stores. Other artillery officers also 
made visits to production centers in order to gain "insight 
into the mechanical branches of their profession" and to 
spread that knowledge among their units upon their 
return." 72 
The February 1 17791 arrangements fixed the basic 
structure of the Ordnance Department until its dissolution 
in 1782. The reporting system, responsibilities 1 and job 
classifications from the Board of War to the lowest clerk 
remained intact. The "arrangements" produced a split in the 
department between civilian and military personnel like the 
British Board of Ordnance. With the exception of the 
military personnel in the Artificer Regiment, the Commissary 
General of Military Stores would command what essentially 
was the civilian branch, while the Field Commissary under 
Knox would constitute the military branch. The course of 
the war and the depreciation of Continental currency, 
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however, were to force Congress to scale back the department 
by cutting pay and personnel. 
Faced with the threat of bankruptcy, the Continental 
Congress moved to cut back the scale of its military efforts 
in 1780. It began to shift duties performed by the 
Quartermaster and Commissary Departments to the States by a 
system of specific supplies. This amounted to an 
abandonment by Congress of many supply responsibilities. 
Congress also did away with many of the commissions it paid 
to staff officers and substituted fixed salaries instead. 73 
The entire effort was directed at reducing public 
expenditures with little thought as to the impact on the 
army. 
Considering recommendations by the Board of War to 
increase the pay and benefits of Ordnance Department 
personnel, Congress moved to adjust their pay scales based 
upon merit. [See Appendix B for pay scales and staff 
levels.] But Congress made cutbacks as well. In the 
future, only military personnel would receive rat ions, the 
others would have the cost of rations or subsistence 
factored into their salaries. This was based on Major 
samuel Hodgdon's belief that those performing in unskilled 
jobs could be hired at little more than the cost of their 
rations. In some cases, piece work was introduced also, so 
that, for example, file cutters would be paid by the inches 
of file cut. 74 
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Following the ratification of the Articles of 
Confederation, Congress moved to abolish the Board of War 
and Ordnance. In its place, in February, 1781, Congress 
created a Secretary at War. Finally, all administrative 
duties relating to the army were to be under one head 
authority, as we have seen, denied to his English 
counterpart. Among his other duties, the new Secretary was 
responsible for obtaining accurate returns of troops, arms, 
ammunitions, clothing and other supplies, and to furnish 
reports on these to Congress. He was to provide for the 
care and storage of all military stores, provide estimates 
of needed items and supply the information to the newly 
appointed Superintendent of Finance, Robert Morris. 
then would see whether the could be obtained. 75 
Morris 
Congress created the position of Superintendent of 
Finance the same day it established the Secretary at War, 
and the Superintendency was to be the dominant position. 
Morris' duties were to "examine into the ••• public expendi-
tures .•• and for establishing order and economy in the 
expenditures of the public money." He was to "super intend 
and control the settlement of all public accounts, to direct 
and control all persons employed in procuring supplies for 
the public service, and in the expenditure of public 
money." 76 Morris also received approval from Congress to 
discharge any officer in any branch of the service who 
handled public money and he was allowed to eliminate many of 
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the officials who previously purchased and transported army 
1 . 77 supp 1es. 
Through his fiscal power, Morris also had direct 
control over the Ordnance Department. The Commissary 
General wrote directly to Morris when requesting funds and 
does not appear to have had to go always through the 
Secretary at war. 
Following the American victory at Yorktown in October, 
1781, a war weary Congress accelerated its cutbacks in the 
army and its supply departments. Congress now passed new 
measures to reduce the army and its support staffs. In 
order to pay debts, many i terns of equipment and stores so 
dearly bought a short time earlier were sold, as well as 
many public buildings. Hessian prisoners were sold to 
. t 78 1ronmas ers. The Commissary General of Military Stores 
also wanted to sell great quantities of shot and shell, 
estimating that they would bring .610-12/ton for shells and 
.67-9/ton for shot. Congress, however, upon the recommenda-
f . d . d d . th. 79 tion o Morr1s, ec1 e aga1nst 1s measure. 
In the fall of 1782, Congress again moved to reduce the 
army and the end of the Ordnance Department had finally 
come. Having already cut the Department the previous year, 
congress now reduced it further, repealing all previous 
regulations concerning it. In the words of the Commissary 
General, Congress had "totally overthrown the fabric of 
years, leaving scarcely a trace behind." 80 His position was 
abolished, leaving him as Commissary of Military Stores but 
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under the Secretary at War Benjamin Lincoln. Officials at 
outlying ordnance posts were dismissed and the stores 
consolidated. The Field Commissaries were reduced in numbers 
and their pay cut again. Now, only one Field Commissary and 
two clerks or conductors were to serve with the main army. 
One deputy and two clerks were retained at West Point and 
with the Southern Army. One conductor would be kept at Fort 
Pitt. 81 The Commissary General had to take the position of 
Deputy Assistant Quartermaster at Philadelphia in December, 
1782, in order to make ends meet. 82 
Field arrangements were changed also. Previously, each 
infantry brigade had a conductor of military stores attached 
to it who received and issued military stores. This was now 
mostly done away with, the stores being handled by the 
Brigade Quartermasters or waggon conductors. Laboratory 
staffs were also reduced. Officials retained in service 
were cautioned that since their positions were now 
"considered as an easy tour of duty no additional pay or 
emoluments would be forthcoming," and that "a living solely 
from the employment cannot be expected." In other cases, 
laboratory staffs were dismissed overnight. 83 
The army, of course, suffered because of these cuts. 
With little staff to assist him, the Commissary General of 
Military Stores wrote the Secretary at War that "to keep the 
business in order I find it indespensably necessary to be 
personnally present to superintend the whole." 84 Great 
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quanti ties of military stores were left unattended. 85 Even 
washington complained arms were getting out of repair 
because there were no longer traveling forges with each 
brigade or the materials to repair them. 86 With a few 
strokes of the pen, Congress had, in a short period, 
dismembered what had taken it so long to build. 
Being reluctant to the centralization of political and 
military power, Congress relied on a series of committees to 
address and resolve the economic, political, and military 
problems which constantly appeared before it. Envisioning a 
war of short duration it adopted an extemporized war by 
committee approach and relied on the republican virtue of 
the free citizen militia to carry the day. 
Political rhetoric and ideology, however, were blasted 
away in the first discliplined volleys by professional 
British and German soldiers in 1776 and were forced to give 
ground to military reality. It came to be recognized by 
even the republican champions like John Adams that the 
struggle was to be a long one and a professional approach to 
the waging of war was needed. Valley Forge was the 
birthplace to the professional approach. Congress expanded 
and reorganized the size of its army, placed it on a long-
term footing, and provided regulations for its organization, 
operation, and support. 
Recognizing that it could no longer control military 
operations on the enlarge scale of 1776 and later years, 
congress established the Board of War and Ordnance to 
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specialize in the military phase while it dealt with the 
economic and political phases. But Congress could not fully 
bring itself to divorce itself from the conduct of the war 
and refused to grant military department heads full autonomy 
to conduct their business. 
Nowhere was this dichotomy seen more in effect than in 
the arrangements made for the Ordnance Department from 1777 
to 1782. The campaigns of 1777 and 1778 demonstrated the 
consequences of divided responsibility and the lack of 
accountability between a politically appointed Board of War, 
hostile in spirit to the army's Commander-in-Chief, and the 
field commanders who needed ready access to military stores 
and knowledge as to what was available. In spite of the 
pleas of Washington and Knox, Congress steadfastly refused 
to concentrate ordnance administration under a single 
figure. Possibly Congress did not consider the issue 
serious enough to risk alienating its loyal servants on the 
Board of war. Possibly, the republican spirited radicals in 
Congress resented the self-styled arrogance and superiority 
professed by professional officers like Henry Knox. But 
most probably, their English political heritage, the fear of 
centralized political and military power, and the fear of a 
professional standing army in the hands of a despot, whether 
King or Parliamentarian, kept them from the enacting the 
logical recommendations proposed by Knox and Washington. 
The system was to remain flawed. But men soon learn 
deal to difficult situations and impossible tasks. The 
Ordnance Department was to prove no exception. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE GENTLEMEN IN BLACK FACED RED 
All laws and regulations are promulgated to direct and 
control the actions of men. While, on the one hand, 
individuals can undermine well-conceived legislation, 
individuals can compensate for conceptual errors in poor 
statutory organizations. This interaction of personality 
plays a critical role in unraveling the story of the 
continental Army's supply departments, and of the Ordnance 
Department in particular. When Congress refused Henry 
Knox's request for full control of the Ordnance Department, 
it prevented the creation of an official similar to 
Britain • s Master General of the Ordnance. Knox did not 
abandon his goal of achieving the unified direction, 
operation, and accountability for ordnance stores. He 
simply shifted his focus and set about creating a unified 
and efficient team of subordinates. 
Colonel Benjamin Flower and Major Samuel Hodgdon, the 
Ordnance Department's two war-time leaders, did much to 
shape its growth. Flower, overworked and in ill health, 
rose to lead the department is its early period through 
petition and political influence. His association with men 
distrusted by washington and his key subordinates led to his 
eclipse. Major Hodgdon, Flower's successor, was also an 
ambitious, hard working, and dedicated soldier. But Hodgdon 
had the powerful support of General Henry Knox, Washington's 
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trusted chief of artillery. Hodgdon proved himself to Knox 
by his efficiency in action following the ordeal at Valley 
Forge when the army carne to place more value on ability than 
on political connections. The selection of Hodgdon, 
initially as the principal field commissary of military 
stores and later as Flower's replacement, gave Knox the 
control over Ordnance Department operations denied to him in 
legislation. 
In January, 1777, Washington assigned Benjamin Flower 
to the new post of Commissary General of Military Stores. 
Flower, the man, has proved to be an elusive figure for the 
historian. Born about 1748, he worked as a hatter in the 
Hight Street Ward of Philadelphia. In 1774, he was assessed 
a city tax of 1541 .• 11 .• 2 indicating that he owned a fair 
amount of property, placing him in a middle class status. 87 
Flower's sister, Rebecca, was to be employed by the Military 
Stores Department making flags, liners for dragoon caps and 
other small items. Her husband, William Young, would also 
do work for the Departrnent. 88 
On July 10, 1776, Lieutenant Flower of the First 
Battalion, Philadelphia Associators, "animated with a just 
sense of the importance of the present contest" petitioned 
Congress for the vacant post of Commissary of Military 
Stores at the Flying Camp. Located near present day Perth 
Amboy, New Jersey, the Flying Camp constituted the reserve 
base for Washington's army in New York. On July 31st, 
President Hancock notified Flower of his appointment. 89 
58 
Young Lt. Flower must have had his hands full. Most of the 
Flying Camp was composed of raw recruits and short-term 
militia--a rowdy and relatively undisciplined group. 
Militia men were notoriously hard and wasteful of public 
arms, losing, selling, or stealing them; ignoring 
rudimentary maintenance; and squandering ammunition like 
schoolboys. Flower was instructed by the Pennsylvania 
Council of Safety to look into these abuses and the 
negligence of the officers respecting them. 9° Flower's 
performance must have been sufficiently satisfactory for him 
to have received Washington's appointment in 1777 as 
Commissary General of Military Stores. 
Flower was an ambitious individual. His new position 
carried the rank of Lieutenant Colonel of Artillery 
Artificers but apparently he also insisted that the word 
"General" be incorporated in his title. Flower further 
sought the rank of Colonel in the artillery which would have 
given him line rank in the army. [As noted, artificer 
officers could rank only in their regiment.) In November , 
1777, Flower petitioned the Board of War for the artillery 
colonelcy, claiming to have held the rank of Lieutenant 
Colonel of Artillery since July, 1776. He also claimed that 
General Hugh Mercer had given him the command of the 
artillery at the Princeton battle in January, 1777. 91 
Flower may have expected his old Associator friends on 
the Board of War, Mifflin and Peters, to help his case. 
When they passed the issue to Washington (and therefore 
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Knox) friction arose. Knox adamantly opposed Flower's claim 
to a colonelcy of artillery and rejected his Princeton claim 
as "totally repugnant to every military principal and 
decisively inadmissible." 92 Knox undoubtedly acted this way 
because in the British system he was following, Ordnance 
Department officials had no command authority in the line 
regiments. If Flower received rank in the artillery, this 
would upset Knox's system. Mercer, unfortunately for 
Flower, was killed at Princeton and Flower could offer no 
other support for his claim. Knox refused to support 
Flower's petition for artillery rank and claimed that Flower 
"had too great an avidity for it." Knox did, however, admit 
that because of Flower's "technical merit, industry, 
activity, and experience" he should have command of the 
artificers but that he was unaware that they were to be 
"artillery artificers." Knox dubiously claimed that 
Congress inserted this artillery artificer language into the 
February, 1778, regulation without his knowledge. He also 
thought that the Springfield laboratory was not to be under 
Flower's command. Washington acquiesced on Flower's title 
of "Commissary General" but refused his request for 
artillery rank fearing that granting this request would 
exacerbate the numerous disputes over rank and seniority 
which were convulsing the officer corps at Valley Forge. In 
approving Flower's title, however, Washington expressed a 
"very favourable opinion" of Flower but felt his rank as 
Lieutenant Colonel to be "fully competent to every purpose." 
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Perhaps as a result of his patrons on the Board of War, 
Congress granted Flower the pay and rations, but not the 
rank, of an artificer colonel.93 
Flower began his new assignment in a most difficult 
period. He faced persistent problems trying to obtain 
accurate information on stores available, enforcing 
accountability for supplies, raising personnel, and 
establishing repair and manufacturing centers. These 
problems were often intertwined and were compounded by 
recalcitrant subordinates and the eighteenth century's slow 
communications. 
A good example of the accountability problem can be 
seen in the shortages of firearms at various times during 
the war. It has been estimated that over one hundred 
thousand French arms alone were imported during the war. 
over 81,000 of these, or nearly 80% were imported by 
94 December, 1777. In addition, over 40,000 muskets were in 
store in Pennsylvania and Massachusetts by 1776. While the 
number of arms available in private ownership is uncertain, 
one estimate states that nearly 80% of the militia units 
supplied their own arms during the war's first year. 95 
Additional arms were also imported from Spain and the Dutch. 
Since estimates of the number of men in service, militia or 
regular, vary from 100,000 to 150,000, it would appear that 
at least one musket should have been available for every man 
who would shoulder it. 96 Yet repeated shortages and calls 
for arms arose. 
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Several possibilities could be advanced in order to 
answer this question. First, sources on the numbers of 
available arms could be in error. Shortages of arms and 
accouterments could have been chronic, but contemporary 
accounts do not fully support this. 97 Also, the pleas of 
army commanders, who could be expected to ask for more than 
they could get, enhanced the appearance of arms shortages. 
Finally, staff inefficiency in record keeping and the 
misdirected issues of arms could have been a factor. The 
confused efforts in Congress leading from the Secret 
Committee to the Board of War, and the built-in inefficiency 
of the 1778 and 1779 Ordnance Department regulations provide 
the most likely answer. Simply put, no one was fully 
accountable during the early years of the war. 
Lack of communication also had an impact on 
accountability problems. Secret Committee agents, such as 
John Langdon at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, may not have been 
fully aware of the transfer of responsibilities to the Board 
of War. For example, in March, 1777, the first French arms 
arrived in two ships. The Amphitrite and the Mercury 
brought in nearly 21,000 muskets and other vi tal military 
stores. 98 Word of their arrival gave Congress high hopes 
that they had adequate supplies for the moment, and that it 
was now men and not materials that were in demand. "If the 
men will enlist they can now be armed and clothed... Weak 
and exposed as our enemies are in the Jersies, to a stroke 
that would be decisive, we cannot avail ourselves of it for 
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want of men, altho we have arms, tents, clothes, and every 
necessary ready for 20,000 soldiers." 99 
Congress ordered 5,000 of the recently imported arms to 
Massachusetts. Whether these arms were actually sent is 
uncertain; but Langdon apparently under pressure from the 
New Hampshire assembly and General John Sullivan to arm the 
recruits begin dispatched to Fort Toconderoga to stop the 
expected British invasion from Canada, issued arms to New 
Hampshire, Rhode Island, and, apparently, a second time to 
Massachusetts on his own account. In April, Washington was 
stunned by an appeal for arms from Massachusetts that he 
believed was previously answered. This indicated a supply 
system without organization or direction. 100 
What was happening was that stores were being issued 
directly to the states without the knowledge of Congress or 
washington's supply officers. These items were retained by 
the States for their own use and when state troops or 
militia were called out they requested a supply issue from 
washington. Also, short-term troops often took their issued 
equipment home with them--a problem which led Washington to 
exclaim that the process "scatters our Armoury all over the 
ld .. 101 wor . Arms obviously were available, but nobody knew 
where they were or who had them. The legislation requiring 
u.s. markings and the establishment of the Board of War as a 
control coordinating authority were attempts to correct this 
problem of accountability. 
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Caught up in the frenzy of effort and constant travel 
in trying to establish his new Department, Colonel Flower 
made some ill-considered decisions and placed too much trust 
in subordinates. He fell victim to the same problems which 
plagued the other supply departments such as that of his 
friend the Quartermaster General Thomas Mifflin. Mifflin's 
department was rife with complaints of inefficiency and 
dishonest subordinates. Typical of the complaints against 
Flower were those of General Sullivan. Sullivan, like 
everyone else in the summer of 1777, was looking for arms 
and ammunition. He sent complaints to Flower of receiving 
arms unfit for service. Flower replied that he sent no 
unfit arms " .•. as I have a public Armourer who examines all 
arms delivered into my Store before they are delivered to 
the troops ...• 11 If the arms were bad or damaged, Flower 
said, the fault was with the troops and the carelessness and 
neglect of their officers "By throwing them into their 
waggons instead of carrying them." If, however, he wrote 
Sullivan, "the officers will suffer their men to receive 
arms unfit for Service, it's their faults and not mine, but 
your Honor may be assured, I will take every method in my 
power to prevent such abuse in the future, for it's with the 
greatest difficulty I can procure arms ••• and unless the 
officers to whose care they are entrusted, take a proper 
method to preserve them, we shall soon be destitute of 
th "102 em. 
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Flower also assured Sullivan that since all the new 
arms had been issued [these must be the arms received in 
March) to passing troops and those repaired reissued as soon 
as they are finished, Sullivan would have to await a new 
supply which was expected shortly. This supply would 
"enable us to comply with all orders from the Army at a 
moment's warning. " 103 Writing to Sullivan again a few days 
later Flower spelled out his problems. " ••• the demand there 
has been on me for every sort of military stores ••• has been 
immense. I have employed every person I could get in the 
different Branches ••• ! shall ever lament as the greatest 
misfortune of my life, that the want of cartridges or 
anything else when called for in my Department should be the 
means of losing this city [Philadelphia)--and your Honor may 
rest assured that every Order for any kind of military 
Stores, that is in our possession or can possibly be 
procured, shall always be attended to with strictest 
punctuality--! have a proper sense of the necessity of 
keeping up a proper supply of everything necessary of the 
defense of a soldier." 104 
But Philadelphia did fall 1 notwithstanding the efforts 
of washington and Flower to save it. Flower again was 
pushed into another round of frenzied activity trying to 
evacuate the ordnance stores 1 and even the Liberty Bell 1 
before the city fell. Moving the stores to Trenton 1 New 




Allentown, Lebanon, York and Carlisle in Pennsylvania, 
Flower traveled constantly that winter. 105 
Partly as a result of his travels, Flower's health 
broke down and he nearly died at Valley Forge . 106 His 
intense activity in the field in late 1777, and his illness 
at Valley Force, prevented him from providing the close 
supervision necessary at departmental headquarters. This 
lack of supervision was to lead to great difficulties for 
Flower and the Ordnance Department and, perhaps because of 
his illness, Washington began to rely more on Knox to 
perform more properly the functions of the Military Stores 
Department and the Board of War, which he distrusted. 107 
By the summer of 1778, Congress was disgusted with the 
supply scandals that plagued the army at Valley Forge. The 
first agency Congress identified for investigation was the 
Quartermaster Department. By this time Continental currency 
had begun its precipitous decline and inflation soared. 
Army officials found themselves in competition with 
speculators and each other, while the troops in camp 
suffered amidst plenty and lost faith in the supply system 
while food and clothing rotted away in warehouses. "There 
is not a Cross Road or Village of three houses," complained 
one of washington's aides, "but a deputy Commissary and 
Quartermaster is fixed there--to do nothing." Congress 
reacted strongly. It authorized the States to investigate 
and remove corrupt Continental officials. 108 While few 
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supply officials were actually proven guilty, their public 
image tumbled. 
Commissions to supply officers as a percentage of their 
expenses were seen to be corrupting influences and the cause 
of rising inflation, but they were one of the few means to 
attract men into the supply departments. Even Quartermaster 
General Greene had the dangle the profit motive to induce 
men to remain in or take Quartermaster Department jobs. "I 
had not the least idea of your resignation," he wrote Deputy 
Quartermaster Hugh Hughes," as you would have the same 
Command, as heretofore, and continue to enjoy all the 
profits and Emoluments of the Office." The Quartermaster 
Department 1 s image became so bad that any association with 
it was looked upon with horror. A Congressional delegate, 
John Mathews of South Carolina, whose committee was 
reprimanded by Congress for some slight, indignantly noted 
that regardless of our character as members of their own 
body, I find we are to be considered as Quarter-Masters, 
etc., and liable to equal insults." 109 
Congress never conducted its planned investigation of 
Mifflin 1 s Department. Perhaps other matters, such as the 
French alliance were more pressing and the delegates 
probably felt that the new Quartermaster General Nathanael 
Greene could correct the problems that plagued the 
Department. It is also probable that Mifflin 1 s political 
and social stature protected him from the criticism that was 
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soon to be leveled at another Department whose leader was an 
easier target. 
In 1777, desperately needing a staff to handle the 
press of Ordnance Department business, Colonel Flower, on 
the recommendation of several gentlemen of the Pennsylvania 
Council of Safety, appointed Cornelius Sweers as an 
accountant in his new department . 110 In August, upon his 
return from a visit to Carlisle, Flower was informed by 
Sweers that auditors had examined the Department's accounts 
and no problems appeared. At first Flower trusted in 
Sweers' honesty, and had no reason not to. Flower also then 
checked the accounts but a lack of time did not allow him a 
thorough examination. Showing his faith in Sweers, Flower 
appointed him to act in his absence and asked President 
Hancock to send Sweers $20,000 for the Department's use 11 for 
which his receipt shall be sufficient ... lll 
Sweers, however, came to betray Flower's trust. 
Suddenly starting to live in a manner that should have been 
beyond his means, and being seen to engage in currency 
speculation, Sweers fell under suspicion. Flower went to 
the Board of War and got permission to have Sweers dismissed 
but decided to wait until Sweers finished an accounting 
project. Finally, upon notification by the Treasury of 
problems with the Department's accounts, Flower ordered 
Major Joseph Watkins, Commissary of Ordnance Stores at 
Lebanon, to 
f . t d 112 con 1sca e . 
have Sweers arrested and his records 
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Sweers sent repeated letters to the President of 
Congress and the Board of War protesting his innocence and 
saying that it was Flower who lead him astray. 113 According 
to Sweers, during the hectic summer of 1777, the Board of 
War ordered Flower to purchase as many arms at the best 
price he could. [In April, Congress itself resolved "that 
it be recommended to the good people of the states, to 
furnish the Commissary General of Military Stores, with all 
such articles as he may want for the use of the army at a 
reasonable price."] Sweers stated that Flower "suggested" 
that since arms' prices went at .66 and up, any amount he 
[Sweers] could buy at a lower price and send to Major 
Jonathan Gostalowe, one of Flower's assistants in 
Philadelphia, with his receipt as to the current value would 
result in a split between himself and Sweers. Sweers asked 
for a hearing and the chance to examine his account book and 
said that if he committed any wrong it was because human 
nature is "subject to frailties in an unguarded moment," 
adrni tting no other frauds. Sweers also added that Joseph 
Nourse, an official of the Board of War and an admitted 
friend of Flower, visited him during his conf inernent and 
asked him for a description of the account book; Sweers 
implied that this was an attempt to locate and destroy it. 
In late May or early June, 1777, Sweers claimed that Flower 
had said that since they were both appointed to purchase 




such purchase." Sweers admitted that he agreed to this and 
cited an example from his memo book: 
Purchase Charged u.s. 
1777 2 June 1 rifle :64 •• 10 :66 •. 5 
16 June 2 muskets 6 .• 0 10 •. 15 
17 June 1 musket 5 •• 0 7 •• 0 
18 June 1 musket 4 •• 0 6 •• 0 
Sweers said that there were other entries like these but 
from time to time he tore them out and destroyed them but 
forgot about this one. 
Acting upon these allegations, Congress moved on August 
3 that Flower, under suspicion for "frauds and malpractices 
in the discharge of his office" be "arrested and closely 
confined in the gaol. " 114 It is at this point that Flower 
appears to become a victim of political battles between the 
conservative and radical members of Congress. 
Congress aligned itself along regional party lines •115 
The Eastern Party, consisting of the delegates from New 
England and eventually Pennsylvania and New Jersey, 
consisted of the old revolutionary radicals like John and 
Sam Adams, and James Lovell. They extolled a virtuous, 
republican militia army and distrusted ·a standing regular 
army and its aristocratic officer corps. They were alarmed 
about war profiteering and were opposed to French influence .. 
They were generally older, less wealthy and less socially 
prestigious men, generally oriented toward "leveling" or 




"Party of the Revolution"; outsiders, such as John Jay 
referred to them as the "family compact." They totally 
distrusted and hated officers like Phillip Schuyler and 
Benedict Arnold. Their opponents, the Southern Party, 
contained the conservatives. Led by men such as John Jay, 
Wiliam Duer, Gouverneur Morris, and Robert Morris, they 
favored French diplomacy, a professional standing army and 
officer corps, and strong mercantile and fiscal policies. 
They feared the "people's revolution" concept of the eastern 
radicals. 
The easterns were now ready for a showdown and perhaps 
a chance to attack Arnold, then military governor of 
Philadelphia and the subject of intense gossip relating to 
his business practices while in that position, and the army 
officer corps through Flower. The showdown came, but not as 
expected. The New England faction voted against the arrest 
order while the New York delegates voted in favor!
116 (See 
Appendix A.) The motion did not carry and a second vote was 
necessary. Apparently, so highly thought of was Flower that 
the humiliating language of the first motion, that he be 
arrested and jailed, was struck down by the overall vote. 
The second vote, which was passed with the two parties 
almost working together, now charged Flower with malconduct 
only. But the friction between Congress and the army, 
represented by General Arnold, was just starting. 
Arnold and others who believed in Flower came to his 
defense. Arnold, as military governor, would have to carry 
: !:;.:. 
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out the arrest order. Perhaps less out of friendship for 
Flower and more out of pique with Congress for lack of 
recognition, or a desire to defend the honor of the officer 
corps, Arnold toyed with Congress. Acknowledging the 
receipt and execution of the arrest order, Arnold asked for 
clarification of whethe'r Congress wanted Flower under common 
military arrest or in close confinement. If Flower were 
only confined in his room by one or two guards, Arnold 
wrote, he might escape unless restrained by a "principle of 
honor" thus leaving himself [Arnold] open for censure by 
Congress for not complying with its instructions. If, on 
the other hand, he put Flower in jail, Congress and the army 
could charge him with exercising discretionary authority 
beyond the intent of Congress. Arnold asked for 
1 . f. t. 117 c ar1 1ca 1on. Henry Laurens, President of Congress, who 
had no love for Arnold--frequently taking the side of 
Pennsylvania's Supreme Executive Council in its own troubles 
with Arnold--replied that it was the intent of Congress that 
Flower "be securely kept in a convenient room under a 
sufficient guard." 118 
Next, Flower's friends, Timothy Pickering and Richard 
Peters of the Board of War, came to aid him. Pickering 
wrote Laurens questioning the meaning of "arrest and safely 
keep." Pickering said that Flower could be "safely kept" 
only by being jailed, adding that Colonel Flower "ever 
sustained the fairest character ••• the purest integrity, and 








activity in business ••. in one word--an officer of singular 
worth." 119 The Board believed Flower's own "guidelines, 
unsuspecting honesty" caused him not to "minutely examine" 
Sweers accounts. Pickering also pointed out Flower's ill 
health resulting from "great fatigues and exposures in the 
public service," and challenged Sweers' credibility. He 
also pointed out that Flower's confinement would cripple the 
efforts of the Ordnance Department to support the present 
campaign and asked Congress "to excuse an immediate 
execution of the order, or at least that a military arrest 
be the only restraint on his person." 12° Congress returned 
an angry letter accusing Pickering and Peters of insult to 
Congress in disobeying its order, and by offering reasons to 
prove Flower's innocence and expressing their "pain and 
reluctance to carry out the resolve of Congress to arrest 
and safely keep Colonel Flower." Pickering finally wrote 
back an apology putting all blame on himself, rather than 
the Board, but added that he felt justice demanded the 
Board's testimony in Flower's favor. 121 
Flower himself was not idle during this period. When 
he received his arrest order from Arnold, he called the 
charges cruel and unjust, and complained that Congress 
should have 
. d t 122 JU gmen • 
granted him a hearing before passing 
He asked for permission to take "air and 
exercise" or to go abroad on parole or bail because of his 
ill health. In support of this request, Flower enclosed a 
letter from Dr. Clarkson, his physician, who stated that 
'•i 
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Flower was recovering from 11 a dangerous oppression of the 
lungs with hectic fever, occassioned by the excessive 
fatigues of his office and ••• is now in imminent danger of a 
total relapse unless permitted to enjoy free air and 
excercise. n 123 Congress granted the request and instructed 
Arnold to allow Flower to take airs at certain hours in the 
custody of one or more 11 Vigilant and discreet .. officers. 124 
At some point, Flower got permission to visit Sweers. 
He told Sweers that a Henry Baker had stated that Sweers 
made Baker sign a receipt for s5 when Baker had received but 
J:;3 •• 15 [must be for an arms purchase]. Flower defended 
himself to Congress by claiming that during the visit Sweers 
admitted making the accusations against him out of advice 
from his [Sweers] friends who told him it was his only hope 
for freedom. In his closing statement, Flower said that his 
Department was the 11 most intricate of any other of the Civil 
Off ices" in the army, and that if he were guilty of any 
omissions it was a result of the 11 Want of abilities and not 
the badness of my heart ... 125 
On August 24, the Congressional committee appointed to 
investigate the case, consisting of Joseph Reed, Francis 
Dana and William Drayton, submitted its report. The charges 
against Flower were found "unsupported" and Flower's 
character remained .. unspotted." Congress ordered FLower 
released and Sweers to be tried for forgeries and fraud. 126 
Tried before the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in 1779, 




sentence, a heavy fine, and punishment in the pillory--the 
b . 1 d t. t. 127 latter e1ng repea e upon pe 1 10n. 
The speed with which this case was settled and the 
furor it provoked between the Congress, the Board of War and 
the army, amply demonstrates the confidence that most 
leaders had in Colonel Flower. Flower's ability, dedication 
and character were no longer questioned. Timothy Pickering, 
a member of the Board of War and a friend of Flower, summed 
up his character in a letter to his wife when he wrote, 
fearing that Flower would resign over his ordeal, " ••• I 
would venture to vouch for Flower's innocence as soon as for 
my own .•. a more honest and valuable officer I do not know 
128 anywhere." 
About the time Flower became embroiled with the Sweers' 
case, a new figure began to emerge in the ordnance field. 
unable to achieve the direct control he wanted through 
regulation, Knox worked out an informal arrangement of 
influence through careful selection of his principal field 
commissary, a position granted the Department in the 1779 
regulation. The man Knox picked for this job was Major 
Samuel Hodgdon. So effective was their relationship to 
become that when Hodgdon succeeded Flower as Commissary 
General, Knox achieved de facto control of the Ordnance 
129 Department. 
Like Flower, Samuel Hodgdon, the man, has proved to be 
an illusive figure. Born in Boston in September, 1745 and 
twice married, Hodgdon served as an artillery captain early 
75 
. th 130 1n e war. His earlier occupation is unknown. At one 
time he held the minor public office of Engineman [fireman] 
on Engine No. 8 and might have worked as a "mechanic" or 
artisan as many of the Bostonians who entered the artillery 
were. 131 Hodgdon's early connection with the artillery 
service and his Boston heritage would have put him in a 
position to have known Knox before the war. His hard and 
faithful work in the service could then be expected to have 
enhanced Knox's recognition of him. 132 
Hodgdon first appears in connection with the Military 
Stores Department when he was appointed Commissary of 
Military Stores by General Knox in February, 1777. Hodgdon 
served in the Northern Department during the Saratoga 
campaign under General Horatio Gates supplying arms, 
especially to Fort Edward, a key American position. Hodgdon 
won promotion from Gates, whom he considered an "intrepid 
Gentleman," because of his efficiency in organizing and 
consolidating military stores returns from uncoordinated 
133 supply personnel. 
Assigned to the main army at White Plains, New York, in 
July, 1778, Hodgdon ran afoul of Major Samuel French, a 
Flower appointee, who was serving there as Commissary of 
Military Stores. Knox placed Hodgdon in charge of the 
army's stores, but French argued that he was the chief 
commissary. Knox examined the case and ruled in Hodgdon's 
favor. 134 French soon departed for Philadelphia, apparently 
to appeal to Flower. Flower sympathized with French and 
.:) 
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took the matter to the Board of War which ruled in French's 
favor. Knox, however, remained firm in his support of 
Hodgdon, and in spite of the Board of War • s opposition got 
him appointed Field Commissary. 135 
Flower and the Board must have resented Hodgdon's 
appointment, even apparently holding back his pay •136 
Hodgdon's connection or favor with Knox, and therefore with 
washington, could have been perceived by Flower as a threat. 
Indeed, writing later to his friend Pickering, Flower stated 
that he believed that he faced "ill grounded prejudices" and 
"enemies" against him "in a certain place."137 From the 
rejection of his earlier claim for rank, and the loss of the 
issue over French, it is quite likely that this "enemy" was 
Knox. On the Board of War as well, Mifflin and Pickering 
were no friends of Washington, and it was no secret that 
Mifflin was critical of Washington for his reliance on Knox 
and Greene for advice, and probably jealous as we11. 138 
Hodgdon tried to soothe the ruffled feelings in a 
letter to Flower and the Board of War by saying that Knox 
had called upon him "to take charge of all the stores on the 
ground," and that the approval of the Board was the "height 
b
. . 0 139 of my am 1t1on. For about the next two years Hodgdon 
served as the Deputy, or principal Field Commissary of 
Military Stores with the main army. Hodgdon worked hard 
improving the operational efficiency of the Department, even 
designing new reporting forms, so "as to annihilate any 




from being the most contemptible in the army." Flower's 
declining health forced him to spend more time away from his 
duties and in convalescence where he often visited at 
Mifflin's estate near Reading, Pennsylvania. 140 
Finally in February, 1780, Hodgdon was officially 
directed to Philadelphia to take "role charge" of Flower's 
Department. Richard Frothingham, a fellow Bostonian, 
succeeded him as field commissary to the main army. 141 
Taking leave of his men, "who wear the Black faced with 
Red," Hodgdon tended his aid "to contribute to the happiness 
of the Gentlemen I have had the honor to command in the 
Field." 142 Hodgdon's new appointment gave him operational 
control of Flower's department. Flower remained on as 
titular head. 
Hodgdon inherited several interrelated problems from 
Flower. Difficult subordinates caused disciplinary head-
aches. Quality control at production centers was poor. 
Congress vacillated as to whether Philadelphia or some other 
location was to serve as the principal military stores 
center. Internal feuds existed among departmental staff. 
Finally, the declining currency caused an inability to pay 
and feed military and civilian workers and to obtain the 
production or repair of needed equipment. All these factors 
combined to hinder the Ordnance Department in its most 
important task--providing the army with the weaponry to wage 
war. 
I! 




Personnel and production were two problems most closely 
related. Poor pay contributed to a decline in morale and 
disclipline and production suffered accordingly. Early in 
the war, Congress established two key production centers, 
Carlisle, Pennsylvania, and Springfield, Massachusetts. 
Both suffered from problems as a result of internal feuding 
by Ordnance Department personnel and the lack of adequate 
supervision. In late 1780, uncertainty regarding possible 
reductions at Carlisle had departmental officials talking 
about a "political purge." Congress proposed placing the 
artificers there under the Pennsylvania state troop quota so 
that they might benefit from that State's generous 
allocations of clothing. However, following an inspection 
trip by President [Governor] Joseph Reed of Pennsylvania, 
himself a former Washington aide, that had identified poor 
production practices, the chances of the men being adopted 
by Pennsylvania appeared slim. Reed claimed that everyone 
there was idle, with more women and children around than 
workers. The wooden and iron work on the cannon carriages 
rendered them useless. 
"public nuisance." 143 
The works were being viewed as a 
At Springfield, rumors circulated 
that the military officers were not getting along with each 
other or the local populace. By 1779, disputes over rank 
between Colonel Ezekiel Cheever, Washington's first 
commissary of Military Stores, and Lieutenant Colonel David 
Mason, an early artillery officer deputy commissary 
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superintending the laboratory, had brought the work nearly 
to a halt. 
Action was quickly taken by departmental leaders to 
check these problems. Carlisle Superintendent Samuel 
Sargent was issued a warning letter on his performance, one 
he apparently heeded as problems at Carlisle seem to have 
subsided. 144 Hodgdon summarily removed officers who refused 
to accept his leadership or who "cared nothing for me or my 
orders." 145 
To deal with the Springfield problem, the Board of War 
dispatched the Surveyor of Ordnance, Colonel John Lamb, to 
examine into the "amazing confusion" there and the 
"character, abilities, and so far as you can judge, the 
conduct of the officers." Arriving at Springfield on 
February 11, 1780, Lamb immediately launched his 
investigation. Lamb reported to the Board that the "anarchy 
and confusion" stemmed from a "clashing of power" deriving 
from divided authority. He recommended the appointment of a 
. 1 . 146 s1ng e superv1sor. 
One of the key personnel problems he identified was 
Major Joseph Eayers, Superintendent of Artificers. 
Characterizing Eayers as "an ignorant, overbearing man" Lamb 
reported that Eayers detained men enlisted by other 
officers, and also artisans whose skills, Lamb said of him, 
"cannot be supposed that you understand the business of the 
laboratory sufficiently to direct them." Eayers also kept 




month and a suit of clothes. Overall, however, Lamb thought 
the Springfield site to be an excellent choice but only 
needed a reduction in staff and more efficient management. 
Basing his thoughts on Lamb's information, Hodgdon 
forwarded his own recommendations to the Board of War •147 
The dispute over precedence, he said, between Mason and 
Cheever produced much division, suspicion, and jealousy. 
This, in turn, produced disgust among the citizens and the 
public business eventually stopped. He also pointed out 
that the post was well situated as good timber was 
available, and lead for musket cartridges could be obtained 
from Boston "at any time." The stores were at such a 
distance as to be safe from attack and the site was a 
healthy one. Hodgdon recommended the removal of some 
officers, and keeping others he thought excellent and who 
could not be dispensed with. Regarding Mason and Cheever, 
however, Hodgdon wrote "the latter is far advanced in life--
the frailties of which he may every day exhibit--and Colonel 
Mason is and always has been detestible to the Department." 
But since they both served since the beginning of the war, 
he diplomatically recommended that they be quietly retired 
'd d f 148 and prov1 e or. 
On July 26, 1780, acting on the reports by Lamb and 
Hodgdon, Congress dismissed Cheever, Mason, and any other 
surplus officers in the Department of Military Stores . 149 
The new Superintendent was, for the first time, to report 





appears that Springfield was not originally placed under 
Flower's command as Knox initially suspected. Left to 
itself, its inefficiency could not then be blamed completely 
on Flower.] 150 Mr. Joseph Hiller was asked to assume the 
post there, Hodgdon telling him "the department at present 
is but small, yet well managed ••• nothing more than a general 
knowledge of business, founded on a good mechanical head is 
. . .. 151 requ1s1te. 
The affair at Springfield showed that Hodgdon could be 
compassionate as well as efficient in managing his 
department. Writing to Colonel Cheever, Hodgdon advised him 
to get his accounts in order "to convince the world that you 
have acted well and discharged your trust with fidelity 1 a 
consolation in my opinion more valuable than the mines of 
Perue. " 152 While Cheever was phasing out his command a few 
months later, Hodgdon wrote him again trying to soften the 
blow of Cheever's son's death acknowledging "it must be a 
heavy tryal for you at this time of life 1 may God support 
you ·under it and in the multi tude of distracting thoughts, 
which may naturally be supposed to arise on such an 
. ..153 occass1on. 
Other departmental personnel problems had . also become 
acute by late 1779. Money and rank were issues which could 
not be easily solved. Writing to the Board of War Hodgdon 
lamented that it could not "fall upon some mode to encourage 
Gentlemen of Abilities to engage in the Military Stores 
nepartment ... but we still live by faith and hope [for] 
... 
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better times." 154 The winter at Valley Forge had seen the 
army's officer corps convulsed over the inseparable issues 
of rank and honor. Resignations and threats of resignations 
abounded. Slighting native born officers who had fought and 
bled for three years, Congress appointed many foreign 
adventurer-volunteers to exalted positions in the 
Continental Army. In addition, it had given military rank, 
and hence prestige, to many staff positions. Nowhere was 
this practice more notorious than in the Quartermaster 
Department. Blacksmiths and waggonmasters held military 
rank and felt themselves too important to do their jobs. 
Baron DeKalb commented on this as "The very numerous 
assistant quartermasters are for the most part men of no 
military education whatever, in many cases ordinary 
hucksters, but always colonels •.• the army teems with 
colonels." The misery of Valley Forge had caused such 
vilification of that Department and its practices, that 
washington refused to grant rank to others in the army's 
supply and staff departments. 155 
Hodgdon, however, felt that Ordnance Department 
personnel needed military rank to perform their duties and 
made several attempts to obtain it. Both continental and 
state military officers and public officials stopped army 
supply trains and took what they needed. Hodgdon pointed 
out to Knox the "incessant reproaches of the officers of the 
Line, calling upon them [Hodgdon's people] to declare their 




contempt because they have none." He cited an example where 
a conductor was arrested by "a Lieutenant whom he lately 
commanded, for striking a soldier who grossly insulted him." 
Hodgdon asked that Deputy Field Commissary be appointed 
captains in the artillery and brigade conductors as 
lieutenants. Hodgdon also appealed to the Board of War, 
pointing out that his staff was assigned to every garrison 
or brigade, and if captured "must expect no other usage than 
that of the private •.• This and the miserable pittance they 
received for their Services ••• has occasioned many 
resignations and unless something is immediately done, the 
Department must sink into contempt. For my own part, 
notwithstanding my determined frugality I am every day 
growing poor, and nothing but my zeal for the sacred cause 
could induce me to continue the present campaign." Justice 
demands, he argued, "that since his men are equally 
exposed ••• so they should have equal rewards .•• for God's sake 
Gentlemen, can't you do as much for us or are we not so 
deserving" as the other staff departments. 156 
Hodgdon was not able to obtain the rank for 
departmental staff as he had hoped, but the Board of War 
requested pay increases from Congress. In May, 1779, it 
sent a detailed report to Congress outlining the distressed 
situation of the Department. Calling the men "useful and 
indispensably necessary people," the Board said that it 
tried to keep them in good temper. The Department was now 
on the "eve of disolution, as the officers, already deeply 
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distressed, will not continue in the Service to their 
certain ruin; nor will a man re-enlist, or recruits engage 
in the Corps, on the present terms .••• "l57 
While acknowledging difficulties with the use of 
soldiers as workers, who with only their military pay had no 
incentive to be productive, the Board pointed out that 
civilian artificers could not be hired or retained. They 
demanded large daily wages and were "transient, clamorous, 
ungovernable and extortionate" even when paid. The Board 
rated the artificer's pay to that of the soldier's salary at 
nearly 10 to 1, and said that they also made more than the 
officers. It pointed out that in the British army a 
carpenter made more than a lieutenant, the artificer 
receiving a Spanish dollar per day plus rations. The 
Continental artificer officers and workers could resign and 
easily better their lot because most had been master workmen 
before the war. Since they could expect no military glory, 
the chief object besides promotion sought by line officers, 
that they had to be provided for pay-wise if they were 
expected to remain in the Service. If the skilled workers 
left, the Board said, "all the Ordnance supplies must stop, 
as we know of none who will fill their places." 
Reluctantly, the Board recommended that Congress 
increase salaries and other grants. It reminded Congress 
that as large as the recommended increases appeared, the 
cost of living was now ten times greater than in February, 





Appendix B for pay scales]. The men who were already in 
Service could be expected to continue on these modest terms 
while it was doubtful if new recruits could be found As a 
final recommendation to induce the men to stay, the Board 
recommended that Congress should adopt the new pay scales 
with provision for merit. Congress passed the pay reforms 
and other recommendations nearly as the Board suggested. 
This enabled the Department to move into 1780 at least on a 
subsistence level. 
Like its British model, the Continental Army suffered 
from a fragmented organization because Congress shared 
Britain's ideological heritage that feared the concentration 
of power, especially military power. The suffering of the 
army at Valley Forge came from a supply system weakened by 
this ideological concern. Divided responsibility led to the 
lack of accountability and poor personnel choices, and 
eventually to corruption and inefficiency. The eventual 
scandal has left the supply system with a poor historical 
reputation. 
The Military Stores or Ordnance Department felt the 
effects of the turmoil. It was split along two lines, each 
of which became subject to partisan political pressure. An 
essentially civilian branch, under the direction of Colonel 
Flower and the Board of War, was responsible for the 
acquisition or manufacture, repair, and distribution of 
military stores. General Knox, on the other hand, commanded 
those operations necessary for the immediate support of 
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Washington's forces in the field. The political and 
personnel schism between the Board of War and Washington 
hampered the cooperation and effective relationships of 
their subordinates, leaving the military stores operation 
confused and unresponsive to the military necessities of the 
battlefield. 
Before Congress dispatched its Committee to Camp in 
January, 1778, to find ways of improving the army, Henry 
Knox already knew part- of the solution to his ordnance 
problems. Frustrated by the refusal of Congress to 
consolidate departmental operations and responsibilities 
Knox turned to the careful selection of all personnel that 
were in his power to appoint. His selection and promotion 
of samuel Hodgdon gave him the de facto control he sought. 
While Flower was a dedicated and hard working soldier, his 
ill health and political limitations prevented him from 
becoming the effective ordnance administrator that the army 
needed. This need for effective personnel relationships was 
coming to be recognized elsewhere in the army as well. The 
relationship between Inspector general von Steuben and 
Adjutant General Alexander Scammell in improving army 
administration eventually led to the consolidation of their 
offices. The relationship between Knox and Hodgdon was 
finally to produce an Ordnance Department responsive to the 
needs of field commanders. The Committee at Camp realized 
this. Writing to President Laurens in February, 1778, it 
said "We proceed now to state the arrangement which we 




propose to make, promising that it is upon the character of 
man principally, and not your Paper Systems that our success 
must depend." 158 How successful this would be will be seen 
in the ability of the Ordnance Department to provide the 
army with the tools necessary for victory as the war entered 






OUR SOLDIERS ARE WELL ARMED 
The success of long years of struggle in trying to 
establish an effective Ordnance Department and supply system 
must be judged by how well the Continental Army was equipped 
to fight. This can be measured by three critical 
standards--by the ability of the Ordnance Department to arm 
the new army field organization authorized at Valley Force 
and implemented by 1779; by its ability to support the new 
combat doctrines of that army; and by its ability to supply 
the military stores necessary to turn back the British 
offensive in the South during 1780-1781. Despite the steady 
decline in the purchasing power of Continental currency and 
the cutbacks Congress made in army organization because of 
it, these were to prove formidable standards, but they were 
met. 
One of the primary functions of the Ordnance Department 
was to manufacture and repair, either in-house or by 
contracts, military stores needed by the army. To achieve 
this ability, Congress had established two key ordnance 
centers, Springfield, Massachusetts, and Carlisle, Pennsyl-
vania. A host of other sites were also added to perform 
particular functions as the war went on. One of these 
sites, Philadelphia, grew to such size because of its 
proximity to the main army's operating area, that it began 
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to rival Carlisle (see Map 1). Each of these sites would be 
in a position to support a particular theater of operations. 
For some time, Congress could not make up its mind as 
to whether or not it wanted Carlisle of Philadelphia to 
serve as the principal ordnance center. At various times it 
issued orders enlarging or decreasing the responsibilities 
of one or the other. By the summer of 1780, as a result of 
mounting currency problems, consolidations within the army, 
and an inability to find workers, Congress proposed another 
round of shifts. The wheelwrights and carpenters were to be 
transferred from Carlisle to Philadelphia because timber was 
becoming difficult to obtain near carlisle, and the mounting 
of cannon could be better done at Philadelphia where the 
tubes were. Transportation costs would, therefore, be 
reduced. It was also thought that more civilian workers 
than soldiers could be utilized in Philadelphia enabling 
congress to save money, since civilians could be dismissed 
when food, money, or materials became scarce. A leather 
factory was to be maintained at Carlisle since leather could 
be got on better terms there. In addition, large stocks of 
oil and thread existed at Carlisle and poplar, the wood most 
suitable for cartridge box blocks, was plentiful nearby. 159 
In June, 1780, Hodgdon set about preparing an estimate 
or proposal for enlarging the laboratory at Philadelphia. 
It was to consist of 12 carpenters, 1 turner, 1 cooper, 10 
blacksmiths, 4 wheelwrights, 1 painter, and 1 tinplate 
worker with another 30 men for "chymical preparations, 
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finishing and packing stores." 160 This estimate also 
included provisions for an armory and ordnance yard. With 
the focus of the war shifting southward, Philadelphia was 
expected to play a greater role in ordnance supply. 
Lieutenant Hoey, head of the facility there, was told by 
Hodgdon that the city was expected to supply most of the 
army's stores adding "Here is a fine company of 
artillery ••• well used to the Business, tools and materials 
in abundance." 161 In the estimate, Hodgdon also laid out 
the duties of the head of a laboratory. He was to par a de 
the men for work, supply materials to keep them employed, 
provide dimensions for transport boxes and the method of 
packing them, compound all compositions by his own hand, and 
use his utmost caution to prevent accidents, especially in 
driving portfires when explosions are possible. 162 
By November, Congress again changed its mind and 
scrapped the shift from Carlisle to Philadelphia. It was 
now considered cheaper to perform the expected work at 
Carlisle. All artificers were to be moved there and 
Philadelphia kept only as an issuing depot with a laboratory 
f
. . . t. 163 for 1x1ng ammun1 10n. This vacillation also occurred on 
the opening or closing of other depots as well. 
Lack of funds and the effects of a severe inflation 
caused further cuts, however. Congress moved to close many 
of the ordnance depots such as Lancaster, Fishkill and even 
Springfield. While Fishkill and Springfield were finally 
spared they were forced to undergo large staff cutbacks. 164 
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So bad was the inflation, that contractors now wanted $100 
for a bayonet and when one of Hodgdon's officers complained 
of receiving no money for his post Hodgdon replied "surely 
$12,000 is some money [the amount Hodgdon sent him]." 165 It 
even appears that Congress considered eliminating the post 
of Deputy Commissary General of Military Stores. [This 
consideration may have been a veiled threat to force Flower 
to resign, but appears to have been beaten off by his 
friends on the Board of war.] 166 
As we have seen, lack of pay was a major factor in 
contributing to poor morale and hence quality of manufacture 
in the Ordnance Department. Currency depreciation also 
contributed to the acquisition and contract difficulties. 
In good times the Department's production could be 
substantial. In March, 1778, Washington was informed that 
the cartridge factory at Lebanon, Pennsylvania, alone could 
produce 6,000 cartridges and a ton of ball each day. The 
Department's Philadelphia operation had become so efficient 
by mid-1779, that it was capable of turning out 60-70 
cartridge boxes per day. So efficient, also, had musket 
repairs become that with adequate pay for workers over 1,000 
could be ready in a week and stocks of repairable weapons 
were being depleted. Tens of thousands of musket cartridges 
could be quickly turned out by civilian workers •167 This 
was more than adequate, as we shall see, to meet army 
demand. Unfortunately, this could not always be maintained 
due to lack of funds and raw materials. 
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The problems relating to quality control and production 
were not limited to the military's own production centers. 
Shot and shell furnished by civilian contractors also caused 
difficulties. Wrong size production patterns supplied by 
the Ordnance Department resulted in the production of out of 
gauge shot. Often times, this was not discovered until the 
shipment reached camp because of poor proofing at the 
furnaces. Referring to one bad load, Hodgdon complained 
that' 154 eight-inch and 116 five and one-half inch shells 
had to be condemned after the trouble and expense of 
t
. 168 transporta 10n. The shipment of wrong size ammunition 
also effected small arms ammunition as well. By June, 1779, 
two-thirds of the army had been equipped with French muskets 
but Ordnance Depots continued to send most of its cartridges 
. . h 1' b 169 in Br1t1s ca 1 er. 
Besides being out of gauge, ammunition was sometimes 
badly made. As early as 1778, the Ordnance Department 
became involved in trying to improve weapons technology. 
Lewis Nicola, commander of the Invalid Regiment which 
occasionally supported the activities of the Ordnance 
Department, wrote a lengthy treatise to Knox detailing 
recommendations for providing better production techniques. 
Noting that the casting was done in sand molds held together 
by wooden forms and therefore subject to distortion by 
shrinking and swelling, Nicola made recommendations to 
correct this problem. Among its duties the Ordnance 
Department also served as an experimental or test facility 
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for the army. Nicola designed machinery for better 
production techniques, but much depended on the attention 
paid by the manufacturers. One Dr. Preserved Clap, a man of 
"great mechanical abilities," while serving in a volunteer 
capacity in 1780, working at the artificer shops in 
Philadelphia trying to develop a machine to destroy 
shipping. The Department also performed tests on gunpowder 
and provided firework displays for special celebrations. It 
also developed a new leather cartridge box to replace older 
tin boxes. 170 
On one inspection trip to Pompton, a furnace operated 
by Gabriel Odgdon, it was found that of 50 shells cast, 20 
were good, 15 needed mending, and 15 were bad or useless. 
The inspector, Major Sebastian Pauman of the artillery, 
reported that the shells looked good at the bottom, "but 
about the fuze hole and ears they look very bad." This 
resulted from drops of iron which tended to settle there 
causing them "not to hold wind." 171 
Hodgdon directed his attention to the problem. 
Artillery officers were dispatched to work with the 
ironmasters who had army contracts to improve production. 
Hodgdon also informed the ironmasters that only those shell 
standing proof at the furnace would be paid for. He 
provided the ironmasters with exact dimensions of shells for 
mortars and howitzers after having measured them himself. 
He supplied officers as assigned to proof the shells with 
detailed instructions on how it was to be done, and, where 
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possible, he supplied them with tools to check the gauge or 
caliber of shot. He noted regarding our manufacturers, "it 
really hurts me to find fault with our own manufactories. I 
am sensible it is discouraging in their infant state but 
duty and faithfulness oblique me to notice every 
imperfection that may occasion disappointment and its 
consequences." 172 
Try as he might, however, quality control was not an 
easy objective for Hodgdon to achieve. Perhaps that infant 
state the American arms industry then existed in, accustomed 
to producing pots, kettles, and other domestic i terns, this 
was too much to expect in a short time. Nearly a year later 
in 1780, the problems, to some extent, still persisted. 
Writing to Colonel John Lamb, Knox complained that some of 
the eight-inch shells made in Pennsylvania were too large 
for the 8-inch English mortars and howitzers. Bauman, a 
rather difficult and sarcastic fellow in the best of times, 
wrote back noting that the problem was nothing new. 173 
While quality control problems were generally internal 
to the Department and somewhat within its ability to 
correct, the troubled financial situation was tougher to 
deal with. Still, Hodgdon worked with the ironmasters to 
achieve a solution. In July, 1780, Congress authorized the 
Board of war to contract for the production of 615 tons of 
shot and 94 7 tons of shells for the next campaign. While 
the Treasury reported that it had no money, Congress 




to be paid in specie or the equivalent in State currency. 174 
This sum was in addition to the $1 million appropriated by 
Congress in January to pay for orders of the previous year, 
but only a third of which had been paid. 175 Hodgdon 
estimated that the shells would cost Ei2, 500 per ton and the 
shot sl,250 per ton. 176 The ironmasters, however, continu-
ally pressed Hodgdon for payment of old contracts. Hodgdon 
was left with no recourse except to appeal to the Board of 
War for funds, and later to the Superintendent of Finance, 
since he knew the ironmasters would probably not extend him 
any credit •177 Reali zing that he was not likely to obtain 
cash, Hodgdon tried to press the new Loan Office 
certificates on ironmasters such as Gabriel Ogden of the 
Pampton furnace • 11 I should recommend,.. Hodgdon wrote 
..... [you] ••• accept the certificates, as from the present 
appearances you will not get one farthing of money for a 
long time, and certificates are almost as much used as money 
and make part of the present commercial Medium, the interest 
178 makes them very acceptable ... 
Lacking money to pay for production, Hodgdon arranged a 
barter or exchange system. One method of acquiring a 
particular grade of iron or steel product was to furnish the 
ironmasters one particular grade of metal in exchange for 
another. In May, 1780, for example, Hodgdon agreed with 
Ironmaster Mark Thompson that the Department would furnish 
Thompson with pig iron for his making bar iron at the 
exchange rate of 17 1/2 tons of pig iron for a return of 5 
,' ::: 
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tons of bar iron. [Pig iron was a low grade of metal which 
was used in the making of steel or could be transformed into 
another type of iron such as bar iron. These exchanges were 
also used for other i terns such as saltpeter for finished 
gunpowder, one grade of leather for another, etc.] The 
ironmasters seemed to prefer working under this arrangement 
but Hodgdon sometimes had difficulty in getting the pig iron 
to them. 179 A direct conversion to the steel grade exchange 
rate could also be obtained as a ratio of 7 tons of pig iron 
for 1 ton of blistered steel delivered at Philadelphia. 
This exchange rate held good at least through the summer of 
1781. 180 
Finally, in a desperate effort to obtain munitions in 
1780, the Supreme Executive Council of Pennsylvania granted 
authority to invoke Martial Law in order to obtain supplies. 
The Board of War impounded all the air furnaces in 
Philadelphia and Hodgdon took over his first furnace in 
181 August, 1780. The intent was to 'reduce a stock of 
damaged cannon and other useless metal into shells and bar 
shot. The takeover of the furnaces lasted into late November 
when a lack of wood failed to keep the workers busy. 182 
Working together in spite of problems, the Ordnance 
Department and the infant American iron industry achieved a 
notable success. Table I depicts grapeshot, shot of varying 
sizes from three to thirty-two pounders, and shell from five 
and one-half inch to thirteen inches. The number of 
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furnaces which produced the shot and shell is given in 
parentheses. 
TABLE I 
American Shot and Shell Production 1775-1783183 
N.E. N.Y. Pa. N.J. Total 
1775 28(1} 28(1} 
1776 132 ( 5) 84{2) 157(2} 195(4) 569(13) 
1777 5(1} 60 ( 2) 135(2} 2(1} 202(6} 
1778 34(1} 219(3} 21(1) 274(5) 
1779 34(1} 51(2} 5(1} 69 ( 4) 
1780 190(2) 534(7) 293(4) 1017(13) 
1781 164(4) 86 ( 2) 250(6) 
1782 340(1) 128(3) 239(2) 707(6) 
1783 309(1) 309(1) 
This geographical distribution of the iron producing 
centers caused immense hardships in obtaining transportation 
to move these stores as we shall see. But it also serves to 
illustrate the magnitude of the Department's success in 
bringing such a far flung operation under effective control. 
The hardships were rewarded finally at Yorktown when, in 
1781, the Ordnance Department and the American iron industry 
worked to provide enough shot and shell in spite of currency 
and transport problems to pound the British into surrender, 
and only a fraction of the munitions available were 
expended, 
. ht 184 n1g • 
as the British defenses were pulverized day and 
What is even more significant about this 
,. 1 
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production is that the American iron industry supplied 
munitions to the French artillery as well. American 
ironmasters produced 85% of the shot and shell expended 
during the war with the result that relatively little 
artillery ammunition had to be imported following the amount 
which came with the initial French ordnance shipments in 
1777. American industry also produced at least 50% of the 
iron cannon, over 650, used during the war, and most of this 
occurred in the early years of conflict. 185 
This level of production also indicates another 
criteria with which to judge the success of the Ordnance 
Department. It was fortunate for the patriot cause that the 
colonial iron industry was so advanced and efficient. 
Despite British attempts to limit the growth of American 
production, such as the Iron Act of 1750, by the eve of the 
Revolution American iron production exceeded that of 
Britain. One seventh, or 30,000 tons, of the world's total 
production came from America. Had not the colonial iron 
industry reached this level of capacity, America's successful 
struggle for independence might not have been possible. 186 
While the transition from the production of household 
goods to military supplies was a frustrating one, as Salay 
has shown, the effort eventually paid off. The Ordnance 
Department successfully marshaled an existing and efficient 
American industrial iron manufacturing base and channeled 
that production capability into the support of the war 
L 
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effort. Through innovative methods of finance, the develop-
ment of a barter or exchange system acceptable to the 
Department and the iron producers, the assignment of 
artillery officers to oversee quality control, a negligible 
amount of impressment, and a good deal of friendly 
persuasion, Hodgdon and the Ordnance Department were able to 
keep the production of weapons, munitions 1 and other metal 
products needed by the army on stream. 
But artillery supplies were only one part of the many 
supply demands faced by the Ordnance Department. Infantry 
equipment, such as muskets and bayonets, cartridge boxes and 
belts, and the ammunition itself, the life blood of a 
fighting army, had to be obtained and distributed where and 
when they were most needed. Shortages of waggons 1 bad 
roads, reluctant drivers, pilferage on route 1 and a 
depreciated currency, all compounded the transportation 
187 problems. 
Despite these problems, the Ordnance Department managed 
to keep the infantry supplied with the necessary equipment. 
To evaluate its performance, we shall examine three supply 
periods. Generally, eighteenth century armies did not 
campaign during the winter months. Weather and crude road 
conditions combined to make movement of troops and supplies 
difficult. By custom, therefore, the period from December 
to June would be spent in what was called "Winter Quarters." 
This was a time to take stock of the year's campaign, 
' ,.~ 
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reorganize and rest a battered army if that was the case, 
and resupply the army in the expectation of new recruits and 
the opening of a new campaign season once the roads dried 
and became passable following the Spring thaw and rains. 
Our test will examine the preparations for the campaign of 
1779. This represents the first campaign under which the 
revised Ordnance Department arrangements of February, 1779, 
and the new Continental Army organization developed at 
Valley Force would be able to work together. 
The winter quarters period of 1778-1779, our test 
period, covered three phases. The first, November-December, 
1778, to January, 1779, serves to represent the entry of the 
army into winter quarters at Middlebrook, or Sommerset 
Courthouse, in New Jersey. During this phase the army took 
stock of the 1778 campaign, discharged soldiers whose 
enlistments would expire, and began the reorganization plan 
approved at Valley Forge. It would be expected that supply 
stocks might be low during this period from the strain and 
losses of the previous campaign. Re-supply efforts would 
also be slow since equipment returns would need to be 
compiled to see where shortages existed. 
The second phase would be that of April, May and June, 
1779. Preparing for the opening of that year's campaign, 
new recruits would be expected and would have to be trained 
and equipped. Veteran units would also receive new issues 
to replace old, lost, or worn out equipment. Improving road 





supplies necessary to carry out these tasks and new 
operations against the enemy. The reorganization plan of 
1778 should also be just about complete. 
The third and final phase, November-December, 1779, to 
January, 1780, should show a repeat of the supply cycle as 
the army entered a new period of winter quarters, this time 
at Morristown, New Jersey. 
In order to gauge the ability of the Ordnance 
Department to re-supply · the new army organization, I have 
elected to examine the re-supply of the infantry brigades in 
These also represent the the main under under Washington. 
units for which the supply issues 
letter books, with a few exceptions. 
are shown in Hodgdon's 
The primary units, or 
infantry brigades, are those shown in Table II, with their 
average strength for the test periods indicated. Table III 
represents the issue of basic infantry equipment furnished 
by the Military Stores Department to the brigades. 
The figures shown in Tables II and III indicate several 
factors in the Continental Army's resupply capability. 
First, resupply generally took place in spring and summer, 
as we expected. The new recruits would be arriving and 
would need equipment. The army would also be receiving 
stores to support its operations during the next campaign. 
secondly, the figures for the spring-summer supply issue of 
1779 clearly indicate the volume of material available for 




PRIMARY MAIN ARMY BRIGADES AT MIDDLEBROOK 
Nov.-Dec. April, May, Nov.-Dec. 
1778 June 1779 





1st Maryland 1380 1232 1214 
2nd Maryland 1324 986 967 
lst Pennsylvania 1211 1257 1137 
2nd Pennsylvania 1045 1086 989 
Woodford's 1041 1148 1636 
Muhlenberg's 964 1240 1411 
Scott's/Maxwell's 1 1065 925 1085 
Total 
Infantry .•••...•••.. 8033 7874 8439 
Artillery2 ••.••••. 764 920 811 
Grand Avg. Total •.•. 8797 8794 9250 
1scott's and Maxwell's brigades serve in camp or are 
detached on assignment. For this study they will be 
interchangeable. 
2since enlisted men in the brigade of artillery were 
issued arms and accouterments similar to the infantry, they 
will be added to total. 
3strength figures taken from Lesser, Charles H., ed., 
The Sinews of Independence: Monthly Strength Reports of the 
continental Army (University of Chicago Press, 1976). 
Figures include NCO, Rank and File present and fit for Duty, 
Rank and File Sick present or on command and extra service. 
While Lesser's work is flawed, it is the best secondary 
summary available. His strength columns do not always 
correlate from one entry to the next and his figures for 
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1 "To" and "by" represent the accounting notation used 
in the military store ledgers. "To" represents the issue of 
equipment to the brigade. "By" represents the i terns of 
equipment turned into military stores by the brigade. The 
figures also include i terns turned in to field armorers for 
repair or received at camp from military stores depots. 
Figure in parentheses represents the percentage of resupply 
in average total strength. 
2This figure represents a complete resupply of 
woodford's and Muhlenberg's brigades and a 96.1% resupply of 
the second Pennsylvania brigade. 
I 
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Department was able to supply 25% or better of the infantry 
needs of the main army. This marked a total re-equipment of 
the main army, because after these units were supplied, the 
June 1 returns from the issuing center at Pluckemin, New 
Jersey, indicated over 2, 000 muskets, 3, 400 bayonets, 4, 600 
bayonet scabbards, 10,500 bayonet belts, and 8,500 cartridge 
boxes were still available for issue if necessary. 188 
This supply capability illustrates the presence of an 
equipment reserve requirement for the Continental Army--an 
ability, or the desire for the ability, to restock supplies 
at a certain level based upon troop strength. 189 While the 
Continental Army organization declined in the absolute 
number of combat formations, the regiments, its fighting 
strength, remained relatively constant through mid-1780. 
See Table IV. This resulted from the consolidation of 
understrength regiments and the arrival of new recruits. 
The work of the Ordnance Department in supplying needed arms 
and accouterments, therefore, did not decline. As we shall 
see, its work load increased as a result of the need to arm 
southern militia units. 
This massive resupply of the army was not an accidental 
event, as it had been planned since the fall of 1778. The 
stores had been stockpiled in New Milford, Connecticut, for 
the 
. 190 
occas1on. In particular, this represents a success-
ful effort to supply the army with cartridge boxes, bayonet 
scabbards and belts, the shortage of which had been critical 
191 in the army. Of cartridges and accouterments, the 
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supplies were more than ample with enough also to supply the 
eastern brigades wintering in the Hudson Highlands •192 Thus 
we see that the entire Continental Army, the main force 
under washington and the brigades covering the Highlands, 
were completely resupplied by the Ordnance Department and 
sufficient arms existed to mount the Sullivan expedition 
against the New York Indians at this time. Reporting their 
success back to Flower, Hodgdon was able to write that the 
army was 11 Well accoutered and in high spirits." 193 Indeed, 
enough cartridge boxes were available that the soldiers 
could be selective enough for the army to ask for leather 
rather than available tin cartridge boxes •194 [Complaints 
had even been received earlier that the soldiers converted 
the tin boxes into canteens and the officers converted 
h . . t h . b ]195 t e1rs 1n o s av1ng oxes. Even the following year, and 
on through the rest of the war, the main Continental Army 
appears to suffer no overall shortages of infantry 
. t 196 equ1pmen • 
Two interesting facts relating to the supply situation 
in 1779 also came to light during the examination of the 
military stores ledgers. First, during the April, May, June 
resupply period 593 muskets and 589 bayonets were turned 
into the camp armorers situated at Pluckemin. Of this 
amount, 442 muskets were turned back repaired for re-issue, 
indicating a 75% repair capability while the army was in 
camp. A total of 226 bayonets, or 38.4%, were also repaired 
197 by the camp armorers. This indicates that at least when 
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TABLE IV 
RELATIVE INFANTRY STRENGTH OF 
MAIN CONTINENTAL ARMYl 
YEAR MONTH STRENGTH % INCREASE 
17772 May 6,795 79% 
October 8,513 
1778 May 14,313 76% 
October 18,647 
1779 May 14,692 
October 18,294 80% 
17803 July 11,038 
detached 
for Southern 
Army in Apr. 3,027 
TOTAL 14,065 
1Figures developed from Lesser. Includes Rank and File 
present fit for duty and sick present. 
2Figures based on 
spans the approximate 
most military stores. 
men. 
May and October returns. This period 
time of active campaigning requiring 
% Increase is over that period in 
3Figures reflect strength following the resupply after 
battles of Springfield in June, 1780. Detachments for 
Southern Army begin with resultant loss of consistnt 
returns. 
the army was in stationary quarters for an extended period 
of time, the field armorers were capable of repairing most 
of the firearms. The lower figure for bayonet repairs is 
reasonable in that a broken bayonet would most likely need 
to be completely re-manufactured, a difficult task to 
accomplish in a field repair shop. Recent archaeological 
excavations tend to support this assessment of repair 
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capability. Work by Mr. John L. Seidel of the University of 
Pennsylvania 1 has uncovered a wealth of weapons parts from 
the area of the artificer or repair shops during the 
Middlebrook period. An army in short supply of arms would 
not be likely to leave this volume of material behind even 
with the transportation problems that existed. 198 
The second significant figure is in the amount of 
ammunition available to the army. Table III shows approxi-
mately 270 thousand cartridges issued from April to June 1 
1779. This figure does not include over 216 thousand 
cartridges received by military stores in camp on June 8, 
1779, giving us an immediately available ammunition figure 
of nearly a half million rounds. Standard army procedure 
called for a reserve of 20,000 rounds per brigade •199 Our 
eight brigades then, would total an ammunition reserve of 
160,000 rounds, leaving about 330,000 for the men or about 
40 rounds per man. This was the figure desired by the 
army. 200 We can consider the average brigade strength to be 
about 1, 000 men 1 so the reserve would allow for 20 rounds 
per man. By comparison, nearly a half century later, a 
division in Napoleon's army, the functional equivalent of a 
Continental Army brigade, carried a reserve of 97,000 rounds 
for 8,000 men, almost half of what was expected of the 
continental Army. 201 The November, 1778, to January, 1779, 
statistic also indicates a large amount of ammunition 
available, over 400,000 rounds issued to 8,797 men, or 
nearly 46 rounds per man. Statistics for the following 
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winter of 1779-80, while showing a decrease in the number of 
cartridges issued, also show nearly 573,000 rounds were 
stored at Plunkemin for about 9,250 troops or 62 rounds per 
man.202 
The army kept its musket ammunition reserve in stocks 
distributed in magazines well forward in the supply chain, 
that were capable of supporting operations whereever the 
army might move, similar to its primary departmental 
manufacturing centers such as Springfield, Carlisle, and 
Philadelphia. Also, if one became depleted the army could 
draw from another. These ammunition stocks were generally 
kept at Succasunna, near Morristown, New Jersey; at West 
Point and Fishkill, New York; and at Litchfield, in western 
Connecticut. While numbers fluctuated, wastage must be 
allowed for, and ammunition returns are not always 
available, it is not uncommon to see over one million rounds 
in store at these centers and up to 200,000 rounds 
immediately available at camp or on ca11. 203 No indications 
exist in the vast campaign literature of the Continental 
Army that any battles were lost due to a shortage of 
ammunition. Surprisingly, evidence of wastage often exists. 
For example, during the Sullivan expedition of 1779 against 
the Indians in the New York wilderness, the troops 
celebrated special occasions, such as July 4th, with three 
volleys of musketry, and the Spanish Alliance and officer 
pay raises with a feu de joie, a running fire by the massed 
troops, which would have expended perhaps 20,000 rounds. 
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The last celebration Sullivan thought was so poorly executed 
that he ordered the men to do it again. Also, ammunition 
stocks were often left behind on the march when they could 
not be transported. One would not expect such displays in 
an army fearful of its ammunition supply, especially in 
Sullivan•s situation where he was so far from assistance and 
204 resupply depots. 
This large supply of small arms ammunition leads to a 
very interesting hypothesis--that the Continental Army was 
capable of and practiced a higher and more sustained rate of 
fire than their opponents. This hypothesis supports exactly 
what Continental Army doctrine stressed, rapid and aimed 
fire. Knox stressed this in his instructions to the 
artillery, along with the American doctrine of anti-
personnel fire rather than the counter-battery fire 
practiced by the British. 205 American infantry doctrine and 
skill also stressed rapidity and accuracy of fire as 
American troops were ordered to direct aimed fire at their 
enemies and were drilled to fire at a rate of four rounds 
per minute. Washington himself valued 11 our Superior skill 
in Fire arms ... 206 The British, by contrast, practiced what 
would be called area fire, pointing in the direction of the 
enemy and pulling the trigger. European armies did not 
place a high value on musketry or individual marksmanship, 
and they did not place a high strategic value on ammunition 
d "t 207 expen 1 ure or reserves. 
110 
An examination of the casualty figures during the 
American Revolution tends to support this hypothesis. For 
example, at Monmouth, American casualties totaled about 320, 
British and German over 420; at Cowpens, American 72, 
British 310; at Guillford Courthouse, American 261, British 
about 600. 208 But a more significant test of this theory as 
well as the success of the Ordnance Department in supporting 
the new Continental Army organization in battle, will be 
found in an examination of the two engagements fought at 
Springfield, New Jersey, in the summer of 1780. 
Following the evacuation of Philadelphia and the battle 
of Monmouth in June, 1778, the war in the North settled into 
a stalemate. The Continental Army was never big enough to 
drive the British from their well fortified positions in New 
York without substantial help from the French navy. The 
navy's assistance here was critical because of the over-
water approaches to the city which had to be controlled. 
The help of the French navy never materialized, however, 
because of its involvement at Savannah and other operations 
in southern waters against the British fleet and island 
possessions. But more significant, perhaps, for the case of 
British inactivity was that the Continental Army had become 
too tough a nut to crack. As early as the summer of 1777, 
Britain's American commander, Sir William Howe, reported to 
his superiors in London " ••• the War is now upon a far 
different scale with respect to the increased Powers and 
strength of the Enemy than it was last Campaign ••• " 209 At 
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the Battle of Monmouth, the British noted that no artillery 
was better served, than that of the Continental Army. 210 By 
1780, the Continental Army had become a formidable opponent. 
New training, doctrine, and a successful Ordnance Department 
must take a major share of the British praise. So success-
ful had the Ordnance Department indeed become, that when 
American planners were developing a campaign plan in the 
spring of 1780, they expected to "neither want Arms nor 
Ammunition." When the projected troop strength for the 1780 
campaign stated that 10,000 additional stand of arms, which 
consisted of a musket, bayonet, cartridge box and bayonet 
scabbard, would be "absolutely indispensible~" they were 
found available and ready for service. 211 
By June 1 17801 the military situation appeared to be 
taking a British· turn. Charleston had fallen in May, and 
several mutinies had erupted among Continental Army units in 
New Jersey. The British commander in New York, Hessian 
General Wilhelm von Knyphausen, thought he saw an 
opportunity to defeat a disspirited army. On June 7, 1780, 
he invaded New Jersey. Seven thousand British and Hessian 
troops moved into New Jersey in an attempted strike towards 
the main Continental Army encampment at Morris town. The 
Continental Army units initially arrayed to delay or stop 
them numbered about 700 men--General William Maxwell's New 
. d 212 Jersey Br1ga e. 
At the end of 1776, washington formed the Continental 
Army on a permanent system of brigades. 213 Initially, 
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Washington was forced into this approach because the 
strength of his regiments had declined steadily during the 
year as battle losses and desertion took their tolls. By 
combining these understrength regiments into brigades, he 
hoped to obtain sufficient musket strength to launch his 
Trenton counterattack. He added artillery to each brigade 
to further augment their firepower. As a result of the 
consolidation of the weak infantry regiments, each brigade 
also came up with a higher ratio of officers to enlisted men 
than found in the individual regiments. This allowed for 
more effective control by commanders. So successful was 
this brigade concept at Trenton and Princeton that it was 
made a permanent part of the army's organization. The 
brigade became a powerful and basic battlefield unit. With 
the punch of its artillery and the degree of control 
exercised by its officers, the brigade possessed the 
mobility and firepower to act independently of the main 
army. To further insure the capability of the brigade, each 
brigade was later assigned armorers and a traveling forge to 
perform small scale field repairs. Items needing greater 
work were to be sent to repair centers such as Trenton, 
Fishkill, etc. All requests for military stores were also 
to come through the brigade commander and ordnance conductor 
. . t 1 ff. . 214 h thus ass1st1ng con ro e 1c1ency. Sue was the case at 
Springfield. 
Faced with overpowering odds, Maxwell's Brigade, with 
assistance from New Jersey militia units, conducted a 
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fighting withdrawal towards Morris town. Concentrating his 
forces near the Springfield bridges, Maxwell delayed von 
Knyphausen long enough for additional brigades from 
Morristown to arrive and force the British to retire. On 
June 23, the British tried a second attack towards 
Springfield. Again, the fighting power of the brigades and 
skillful use of terrain by the rebels forced them to 
retreat. 
American doctrine and training which stressed rapidity 
and accuracy of fire had its first real test and passed with 
flying colors. The Hessians faced with "unaccustomed resis-
tance" took heavy casualties in their sector. The British 
elite brigade of Guards suffered equally from the intense 
level of American musketry with their officers noting "that 
tremendous and intolerable fire which His Majesty's brigade 
d t . d .. 215 of Guar s sus a1ne ••• General Maxwell's Brigade bore 
the heaviest part of each day's fighting in the "closest 
action I have seen this war." 216 The intense level of 
fighting is further attested to by stores issued by the 
Ordnance Department after the battle. It had to replace 
damaged arms and equipment and resupply ammunition reserves. 
Evidence of its success is indicated by the fact that about 
2,000 damaged arms were collected by the Department 
following the two battles. These arms were replaced in army 
reserve by the end of July. Two brigades, Maxwell's and the 
First Connecticut expended almost their entire ammunition 
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reserve, 20,000 rounds and 17,000 rounds, respectively, and 
these losses were replaced in less than a fortnight. 217 The 
rate of fire in Maxwell's Brigade equaled nearly 30 rounds 
per man, far in excess of what most European armies would 
'd d 218 have cons1 ere necessary. 
Despite the army's success at Springfield, 1780 was to 
prove a setback to American hopes. The surrender of 
Charleston cost the Continental Army over 5,000 men, 8,000 
cannonballs, nearly 6,000 muskets, 33,000 rounds of small 
arms ammunition, and enough gunpowder, 376 barrels, to make 
a million and half more. 219 At Camden in August, 1780, the 
American southern field army was destroyed with the loss of 
nearly 1,000 men, 4,000 muskets and most of the army's 
220 waggons and baggage. As if these military defeats were 
not crushing enough, in September Benedict Arnold attempted 
to betray the fortress at West Point to the British. 
American morale sank to its lowest point in the war. To 
stave off defeat in the South, an American military 
organization and army would have to be rebuilt from scratch. 
It was to be the Ordnance Department's most crucial test. 
In order to support the defense of the south, Congress, 
in the 1780 arrangement of the Ordnance Department, provided 
for a new Continental laboratory at Westham, or Point of 
Forks, Virginia, not far from Richmond. The establishment 
of the post was based upon a recommendation by the Board of 
war and it was to be commanded by Captain Nathaniel Irish of 
the artificer regiment. Thomas Jonas was appointed 
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principal field commissary of military stores for the 
southern army under Horatio Gates and later under Greene. 221 
Having been assigned a working staff of artificers, 
Irish was ordered to proceed to Carlisle where he was to 
draw materials needed for the new laboratory such as steel 
plate, saws, sheets of tin, and gunstockers tools. He was 
also to recruit an additional blacksmith and carpenter. 
Irish was to be under the Commander in Chief of the southern 
army or the commander of the artillery, and only under the 
most "extraordinary" cases and at his own "discretion 11 was 
he to assist or obey requests from the Governor or Council 
f 
. . . 222 o V1rg1n1a. 
In the spring of 1781, the Board of War ordered Hodgdon 
to increase the Virginia staff by contracting for 6 
carpenters, 2 gunstockers£ 2 wheelwrights, 4 gunsmiths, and 
2 mailers. These men were expected to be drawn from the 
post at Carlisle which had been ordered reduced in personnel 
that March.
223 
The decline in value of Continental Currency hindered 
Irish's efforts. In order to provide operating funds, Irish 
was sent a Bill of Exchange of $10,000 drawn on the State of 
Virginia so 
.. t .. 224 sp1r1 • 
that he might 11 carry on the business with 
Since Virginia was then under invasion by the 
British, no objection to this was expected from the State 
and Robert Morris, the newly appointed Superintendent of 
Finance, wrote to the United States Treasurer, Michael 
Hillegrass, to issue the draft. Virginia, however, refused 
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to honor it because it was not drawn against the Continental 
loan officer. This meant that the State was expected to pay 
the bill out of its own contribution or appropriation for 
Continental expenses. The State's payment, however, had 
already been made so this would have amounted to a new 
tax. 225 After much debate and wrangling between State and 
Continental officials the bill was finally cancelled in 
April, 1782. But how, Hodgdon asked, was he to receive 
f d ?226 un s. 
The issue of the $10,000 bill serves to typify the 
primary difficulty that faced the Ordnance Department, and 
the entire American war effort, in this late period--the 
lack of money. Inflation had caused the exchange rate 
between paper money and specie to reach 100 to 1. The 
shortage of funds for contracting the production of shot and 
shell, accouterments, swords, and firearms, and the repair 
of these i terns, as well as the pay, feeding, and clothing 
for members of the Department served to frustrate the 
Department's operations. A loan or gift of firearms from 
the French was one thing, it would not cost any money. 
Keeping those weapons in operation was another question, one 
that cost money. Because he could not pay building rents, 
Hodgdon even had to reduce the size of the Department's 
operations in Philadelphia, and had to turn to a barter 
system in order to obtain supplies. It is little wonder 
then that he frequently closed his correspondence to 
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subordinates with the caution--"You will be frugal in your 
expenses." 227 
The strain on the Ordnance Department caused by 
inflation was compounded in the southern war effort. It not 
only had it to rebuild the military stocks lost at 
Charleston and Camden, but it also had to support a new 
southern army. In addition, it now had to provide massive 
amounts of equipment to southern militia units, a task it 
does not appear to have faced to any degree in the North. 
The biggest drain on the Military Stores Department 
does not seem to be the demands of the Continental Army, 
however, but the incessant pleas of the states to arm their 
militia forces. The militia was a constant drain, a void 
into which the Department poured money and munitions. 
General Greene, as a battlefield commander in the South and 
earlier as Quartermaster General, had first-hand knowledge 
of this as many officials often confused the Quartermaster 
and the Ordnance Department in their requests for 
1
. 228 supp 1es. Writing to his brother from Valley Forge, 
Greene said "This war I am persuaded will terminate in a War 
of Funds, the longest purse will be triumphant ••• the militia 
are a constant drain upon our provisions and military stores 
of all kinds .•• we are paying and subsisting thousands and 
thousands of men that scarcely render the least shadow of 
advantage to the cause; these men are consuming our 
provisions, wasting our arms and ammunition ••• draining our 
d d 






Hodgdon found a way to mitigate at least part of the 
problem--issuing the militia, wherever possible, with 
substandard equipment and saving the better quality i terns 
for the Continentals. He also imposed a tough account-
ability system on the various Governors as well. In June, 
1779, Knox had completed a 100% resupply of the army with 
cartridge boxes and other accouterments. The old boxes he 
directed Hodgdon to supply to the militia. Some poor 
quality or irreparable i terns were issued to militia units 
even as late as 1782 as Hodgdon believed that "parade rather 
than real service will probably be their use." 230 When 
requested to supply militia units in 1780, Colonel Flower 
stated "We never supply militia with anything unless they 
are called out to actual service, and then only on the 
application of the Governor ••• who is made accountable either 
to return what military stores he may have received or to 
pay for them at their value if lost in Service." 231 Summing 
up the army's financial straits in the fall of 1780, an old 
military stores' veteran Colonel Hugh Hughes, now serving 
with the Quartermaster Department, wrote to Colonel Lamb 
" ••• cash is not so much as known to the new Department and 
the old Department mortgaged all the stores." 232 
Supply efforts to sustain the southern war effort 
illustrate the crucial role that the poor financial 
situation was to play. Large numbers of arms were available 
to answer demands. These arms, generally however, needed 
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some repair, requiring workmen and supplies to put them into 
commission. 
In May, 1780, Hodgdon ordered Major Gastelowe, his 
assistant at Philadelphia, to have 1,500 muskets, new 
cartridge boxes, bayonets, bayonet belts aand scabbards, 
ready for immediate shipment. One month later, he requested 
3,000 additional muskets and bayonets, and 6,000 cartridge 
boxes. Flower believed that much more infantry equipment 
was available than was needed. Anticipating that once the 
army was on the move the field armorers would not be able to 
keep up their work, he ordered that all damaged arms were 
ordered to be sent to the repair center at Trenton, New 
233 Jersey. 
The inability to purchase material for repairing arms 
and to pay the workmen was a constant problem. Large 
quanti ties of arms could be made available but as Hodgdon 
wrote " ••. not a dollar is to be found in any Department." 234 
Of the $1 million authorized the Department in January, 
1780, by July only about one-third had been supplied. As 
late as October, with requests for arms increasing because 
of British activity in the South and because of stock 
drawdowns, thousands of repairable muskets were available 
but could not be fixed for issue, Hodgdon lamenting, " .•• not 
a man in the Department is this day at work ... on account of 
the stoppage of rations and other grievances." The Board of 
war, in a report to Congress, was even more specific, 
stating that an "absolute famine" prevailed among the 
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workers, no war k was being done and no discipline enforced 
as "the men cannot consistent with any principle of justice 
be forced to work when the public cannot enable them to 
eat." 'rhe men would wait on their pay [many had not been 
paid since March] if they could receive food. 235 
In June, 1780, Hodgdon reported that he had 2,800 
repairable muskets in store, of which 1,000 of the best 
could be made ready in a week if pay and rations, and a gill 
of rum per man each day, were available. He could also 
produce a thousand cartridge boxes. In July, he requested 
$54,000 for the repairs almost completed on 1, 500 muskets, 
and if granted $480,000 he could repair the 3,000 muskets on 
hand at 20 shillings specie each within three months. At a 
total cost of $1,080,000 he could also supply 5,000 new 
cartridge boxes at $500,000 and 5,000 bayonet belts at 
$100,000. 236 
In September, 1780, Hodgdon again requested funds 
stating that of the muskets on hand, 5,000 stand could be 
repaired in three months with the best 3,000 in six weeks at 
an estimated cost of 17 shillings 6 pence specie for each 
musket, bayonet and scabbard. 237 What is evident here is 
that between 5,800 and 7,800 muskets were available if only 
funds to put them in serviceable condition could be 
obtained. It is significant to note also, that this repre-
sents arms in hand and not requests to purchase new ones. 
This is also consistent with the fall off in arms 
importation noted by Gluckman. 
-----~~-~---
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In October, 1780, realizing that considerations needed 
to be given for the 1781 campaign, Hodgdon provided a 
preliminary estimate requesting 1542,019 consisting of 
1525,867 for wages, 1515,332 for materials, and 15820 for 
rents. These figures were based on specie payment and in 
current costs. 238 In December, he submitted what appear to 
be the detailed cost estimates totalling almost 15200,000. 
Within this figure was allocated 1515,000 for the repair of 
10,000 muskets and 1520,000 for 20,000 new cartridge boxes, 
plus funds for 500 dragoon swords and 500 pairs of dragoon 
pistols. Enough flints were requested to support the firing 
of at least 1 million rounds of small arms ammunition, 
. b 1' f . . d f. d . 239 support1ng our e 1e 1n a rap1 1re octr1ne. 
In early 1781, Hodgdon submitted additional estimates 
for the approaching campaign. Among the requests was 
$180,075 for 1 million musket cartridges, confirming our 
earlier estimate. In adition he requested almost 15900 to 
repair 1,726 muskets and 1,698 cartridge boxes recently 
turned in by the Pennsylvania line. 240 [This probably 
represents the arms turned in from soldiers discharged as a 
result of the Pennsylvania mutiny in January.] 
Hodgdon also prepared an estimate for Congress of the 
items needed to complete the Southern Army amounting to 
521,319 including the repair of 5,000 muskets, 5,000 new 
cartridge boxes, 200 pairs of dragoon pistols and a half-
million musket cartridges. So critically short of money was 
the Department, however, that Hodgdon had to promise workmen 
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"a gallon of rum, as soon as the work is finished--and a 
quart a day while in hand." 241 
Supplying the southern war effort was indeed a 
formidable task. By the summer of 1781, Hodgdon was calling 
for "all the pistols repaired or repairable, and every sword 
that may be found that can be made useful to a Horseman." 242 
Almost in despair, he wrote to Colonel Pickering on the 
Board of War that his efforts did not seem enough, "the 
demand is by no means completed, the whole country previous 
to these supplies being unarmed and consequently useless--
could I shortly obtain arms sufficient for the whole militia 
already assembled, and swords and pistols to mount the 
cavalry that offer themselves and horses as volunteers, I am 
ready to conclude the ravages that now mark the traces of a 
graceless Army ..• would soon terminate, and the ferocity of 
the Lion, be reduced to the harmlessness of the Lamb. n 243 
Closing, he asks for the 2, 000 muskets and 2, 000 cartridge 
boxes in store at Fishkill. 
The Department met the challenge, however, and its 
efforts helped turn the tide in the South. In June, 1781, 
Hodgdon was able to report to Knox that in the last three 
months, 3,000 muskets had been sent south for the 
continentals and another 3,000 for the militia, while he 
regretted that 3-4,000 repairable muskets were laid up in 
Albany due to a lack of funds. 
244 
In June, 1, 500 muskets 
were supplied to Maryland, 2, 500 to Virginia, and 1, 500 to 
North Carolina, 5,500 arms in all. Many of these arms were 
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first rate and in the words of William Sharpe, North 
Carolina delegate, "equal to any in the army, with good 
bayonets." 245 But so great was the demand that even rampart 
guns [large bored and heavy weapons normally intended to be 
mounted in fortifications] had to be pressed into service. 
It was learned that "on enquiry ••• with a small alteration, 
and fixing bayonets to them •.. are capable of being rendered 
exceeding good field arms." Nearly 1,000 of these guns were 
. d . . . d 1 d 246 tssue to V1rg1n1a an Mary an . 
The examples we have cited in this last discussion, the 
Middlebrook resupply and Sullivan's 1779 campaign, the 
battles of Springfield in 1780, and the rebuilding of the 
southern war effort in 1780 and 1781, point abundantly to 
the success of the Ordnance Department. Hard work, 
innovation in arranging production and supply in the face of 
a totally debased currency, and effective personnel rela-
tionships between departmental leaders and field commanders 
helped tip the scales, so heavily weighted against the 
Americans, towards victory. 
While the success of the Ordnance Department throughout 
the war was indeed remarkable, it did not occur in a vacuum. 
Army supply efforts were mutually interdependent and a 
failure in one department of ten caused hardship in another. 
In the case of the Ordnance Department, transportation, or 
the lack of it, was often a critical factor in its ability 
to supply the army. 
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Transportation, in the form of waggons, teams, and 
drivers, was a responsibility of the Quartermaster 
Department. The Ordnance Department was forced to rely on 
Quartermaster staff for transporting the stores that had 
been accumulated with such great trouble and expense and 
oftentimes the Quartermaster could not provide trans-
portation. Hodgdon was sometimes able to solve this through 
direct intervention. Relying on his rapport with Knox, 
Hodgdon could reach up the supply system chain of command 
directly to Quartermaster General Greene. Hodgdon told 
Greene that he had only 41 waggons allotted to his 
department in July, 1779, and that this represented a large 
decrease from the previous year. He stated that with 59 
wagons, the Ordnance Department could keep the army "fully 
supplied with military stores." 247 This didn't always work, 
of course, and ordnance supplies could sometimes not be 
248 shipped when needed. This same situation also resulted 
in the plentiful supplies of food and clothing needed 
desperately at Valley Forge to rot away in warehouses. 249 
But here it appears that priori ties must have been set in 
distribution of supplies. An army can fight when it is 
hungry and it can fight when it is cold and ill-clothed. 
But no army can fight without weapons. While we cannot 
document this priority system, the fact that so many 
thousands of tons of arms, ammunition, accouterments, shot 
and shell were moved, particularly in support of the 










is reasonable to suggest that the army placed a higher 
priority on the transportation of ordnance stores than other 
badly needed items such as food and clothes. The fact that 
by 1779 waggons and teams were increasingly hard to come by 
attests to the effective relationship developed between 
Hodgdon and the Quartermaster Department. 
Some transportation problems proved even more 
difficult. The poor conditions of colonial roads often 
resulted in ordnance waggons being able to carry only two-
thirds of their normal loads. 250 While a waggon load of 300 
cartridge boxes and 300 bayonet belts might prove an easy 
load, heavier loads such as muskets and ammunition would be 
left along the road when exhausted horses and broken-down 
waggons proved unable to haul them. Such abandoned stores 
proved ripe for theft by the local citizens, and dishonest 
drivers compounded the problem. Hodgdon had to urge his 
brigade conductors, who were responsible for the waggon 
trains, to try and obtain guards and to be watchful of the 
ft . '1' 251 drivers who were o en c1v1 1an contractors. 
While we cannot completely document the solution to 
these transport problems, the successful outcome of the 
southern war and the victory at Yorktown indicate the 
glorious triumph of the Ordnance Department, a department 
little recognized by historians for the critical role it 
played in support of the Continental Army. Samuel Hodgdon 
and the Ordnance Department could not have received a 
greater compliment than that given by Superintendent of 
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Finance Robert Morris in 1781. Morris, who controlled the 
army's pursestrings and who saw his duty to be the raising 
of revenues and the expenditures of them in the most frugal 
manner rather than as a patron of the army or its supply 
departments, noted "Our soldiers ••• are well armed, (emphasis 
added) and in a Degree they are clothed; we have also 
ammunition abundantly sufficient for the common operations 
f h F . ld .. 252 o t e 1e •.. 
The true test of an army is performance--how well it 
can bring the strengths of its society to bear on the 
battlefield. The Military Stores, or Ordnance, Department 
was one of the factors that enabled the Continental Army to 




Pre-revolutionary Americans developed many of their key 
political, social, cultural and religious institutions from 
British roots. These institutions were shaped between 1607 
and 1775 to meet special conditions the colonists found in 
North America. On the eve of their struggle for 
independence, the revolutionary leaders naturally turned 
once again to Britain for an institutional model. The 
Continental Congress, General Washington and other military 
leaders created an army which reflected their previous 
exposure to the British Army. Like their other borrowings 
from British roots, the Americans adapted British military 
systems to meet their own local needs and conditions. In 
many respects, the 11 child" ultimately became superior to the 
"parent." 
This thesis has examined one poorly understood factor 
in that new American or Continental Army and its ponderous 
supply system--the Commissary General of Military Stores, or 
Ordnance, Department. Called into being in January, 1777, 
the Ordnance Department, like the army it supported, evolved 
from a British model. While indebted to foreign powers such 
as France for contributions of arms and equipment, they 
exerted no influence on the evolution of the Department • s 
administration or operation. 
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Like the army it supported, the Ordnance Department 
faced many difficult tasks. The delegates in the 
Continental Congress sought to limit the concentration of 
political power by using numerous temporary committees to 
conduct business. They were also determined to keep the 
military subordinate to civilian authority, and institu-
tionally structured the army to further this goal. 
Operational power was shared by separate territorial 
departments, and the central staff was divided into 
functional departments. Throughout the war, Congress 
refused to delegate total responsibility and authority for 
military affairs to a single head. No matter how costly or 
inefficient, · Congress' regulations forced the army's 
Ordnance Department to answer to men subject to and abusive 
of political interests, rather than to the army commanders 
who needed to know quickly and accurately what stores were 
available or obtainable. Capable and dedicated soldiers 
such as Colonel Benjamin Flower fell victim to the political 
intrigue and suspicions inherent in this sytem. 
The original system of military organization which was 
driven by political concerns fared poorly against the 
disciplined musket volleys and 
professional British and German 
bayonet charges of 
soldiers during the 
campaigns of 1776 and 1777. The army's supply system then 
collapsed during the terrible winter at Valley Forge, when 
nearly 3, 000 men died from starvation, cold, illness and 
neglect. The resulting scandal and inquiries forced Congress 
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to reevaluate its political ideologies to the cold realities 
of military defeat. While still not prepared to grant full 
control of military departments and functions to army 
commanders, Congress recognized the need to delegate more 







reluctantly accepted the 
General after he was 
prevailed upon by members of Congress who recognized his 
competence. In a rare concession, they even allowed Greene 
to handpick his own deputies. 
The situation in the more technically oriented Ordnance 
Department is less clear-cut. General Henry Knox, during 
the early years of the war, fought in vain to consolidate 
the army's weapons and combat equipment under a single head. 
He clearly hoped to centralize matters under an officer 
comparable to and patterned after Britain's Master General 
of the Ordnance. Knox clearly envisioned himself in this 
role and when Congress repeatedly refused to pass 
legislation to grant him the authority he wanted, Knox 
pursued a different strategy. Knox summoned forth a 
subordinate with the proven tact and skill needed to succeed 
under the restrictions imposed by political realities, and 
then worked for his promotion. By maneuvering Major Samuel 
Hodgdon from field commissary to department head, Knox was 
able to achieve the de facto control he sought. The result 




to the needs of field commanders in a matured and 
professional army. 
Administrative reforms did not prevent occasional 
shortages of ordnance stores, however. Unsound currency, 
lack of transportation or raw materials and 
interdepartmental disciplinary problems seemed to always 
linger. On the other hand, the Continental Army that 
marched out of Valley Forge in June, 1778 never faced a 
critical shortage of ordnance stores which seriously 
affected its military operations. While the southern war of 
1780-1781 in particular proved to be a bottomless pit for 
ordnance stores and severely taxed the department's 
resources, the Ordnance Department and its leadership met 
the challenge. Plentiful artillery supplies in 1781 allowed 
American and French cannon to totally destroy British 
defensive works at Yorktown. Infantry equipment issues 
resupplied the main army at Middlebrook and the brigades 
defending the Hudson Highlands in 1779. Enough infantry 
equipment and ammunition also existed to provide for 
sullivan's independent expedition against hostile Indians in 
New York that same year, even as the growing torrent of 
thousands of arms had begun to flow south. Ammunition 
stocks, the single most critical logistical concern in any 
army, proved to be one of the department's greatest 
accomplishments. Enough ammunition was accumulated to meet 
the battlefield demands of the army's new doctrine of rapid 
and accurate fire. This system worked so well that General 
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Sullivan had no concerns about firing away ammunition in 
frivolous salutes during his wilderness expedition. British 
casual ties at Springfield, Cowpens and Guilford Courthouse 
attest to the success of these efforts. 
In 1780, not only did the Ordnance Department rebuild a 
collapsed southern army and its ordnance stocks from 
scratch, but it was also able to supply militia forces with 
thousands of arms, decisively tipping the scales in the 
South in America's favor. Professor Bowler asserts that 
British inability to arm their southern loyalists, even by 
stripping those in New York of their arms, did much to lose 
loyalist support in the South. A southern militia, equipped 
by the efforts of the Ordnance Department, contributed to 
that loss. 
The true costs of this succes in fiscal or human terms 
cannot accurately be assessed. Table v only hints at the 
monetary costs involved. In 1779, $3 million was advanced 
to Colonel Flower's Department out of a total Board of War 
appropriation of $7.5 million. The Board of War had its own 
funds for operations similar to those performed by the 
Ordnance Department and it paid, on its own,$87,621 to buy 
arms, $20,000 to William Henry to repair arms, and $300,000 
to purchase military stores--tasks that should normally have 
been left to Flower. 253 In 1780, expenditures for the 
Ordnance Department came to about $3.5 million. The Board 
of war received about $7 million out of a total 




Thus, it would appear that the Ordnance Department received 
at least $6.4 million directly, during 1779 and 1780. By 
comparison, Thomas Mifflin estimated the Quartermaster 
Department's expenditures from August 1775 to April 1778 to 
be about $8 million. 25 5 Not withstanding the effects of 
inflation in 1779 and 1780, the Ordnance total seems 
impressive. Yet, it never seemed to be enough. 
TABLE v256 
Congressional Expenditures, 1775-1779 
1775-76 1777 1778 1779 
Pay of the 
army $ 9,371,302 $ 9,633,351 $14,730,073 $15,788,372 
Commissary 
of Provi-
sions 2,539,555 5,755,307 21,003,016 52,761,773 
Commissary 
of Military 
Stores 256,390 504,623 3,044,837 
Quartermaster 
756,553 3,133,302 Department 17,806,571 56,585,666 
Clothing 
Department 657,874 1,053,182 3,742,985 7,710,523 
Hospital 
18,150 482,050 1,145,000 Department 1,496,144 
Barrackmaster 
General 25,000 75,000 773,000 
Miscellaneous 6,712,233 6,087,751 7,958,001 11,543,543 




Evaluation of the human costs is even more difficult. 
Since supply officers do not serve in combat actions, the 
counting of dead and wounded will not 
different kind of human toll which 
assessing the success of the Ordnance 
suffice. It is a 
must be gauged in 
Department. Many 
supply officers suffered financial ruin and loss of honor 
for their efforts in America's "glorious cause." Service in 
the supply line was looked upon by many as an onerous, 
thankless task. While some men sought wealth, most labored 
under a spirit of patriotism and their only reward was the 
personal satisfaction of a job well done. In the Ordnance 
Department, while few men left in disgrace, many were 
dismissed or cashiered due to incompetency or their 
inability to work with departmental leaders. Enlisted men 
and their families suffered perhaps more due to lack of pay, 
clothing and provisions. Their sacrifices are noteworthy 
since many were artisans whose skills would have brought 
adequate compensation in civilian practice. 
For Colonel Flower, association with the wrong 
political faction lead to his alienation from Washington and 
Knox and to his eventual ouster as Departmental head. The 
impact of his trial in the Sweers case on events cannot be 
measured, but the strain of his defense and confinement so 
soon after his near fatal illness at Valley Forge must have 
contributed to his already weak constitution. In April, 
1781, death relieved Colonel Flower of further efforts in 
the Department to which he had contributed so much of his 
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labor and life, and deprived him of the satisfaction of 
seeing the Ordnance Department realize its full potential 
and contribution to victory. 
For Major Samuel Hodgdon, the rewards were many. 
Following Flower's death, Hodgdon petitioned the Board of 
war for the position of Commissary General of Military 
Stores. In July, 1781, Hodgdon's petition was approved by 
resolve of Congress and, undoubtedly, with the influence of 
Knox. 257 Success would crown his efforts by victory in the 
southern war that culminated in the ability of the Ordnance 
Department to supply shot and shell to American and French 
seige guns at Yorktown. Unfortunately, Hodgdon was forced 
to oversee the reduction of his Department in 1782 by a war 
weary Congress and to accept work in the Quartermaster 
Department to compensate for corresponding reductions in his 
salary, but his labor and loyalty to his duty and superior 
would be rewarded later by Henry Knox, then Secretary of 
war. 
In a short time Congress dismembered what had taken so 
long to build. Being the compassionate man that he was and 
always mindful of the welfare of his men, Hodgdon left 
instructions for one of his last wartime acts. Congress had 
ordered the Army's invalid soldiers to West Point which now 
was to be their residence. Expressing his principal concern 
for their "comfortable removal" Hodgdon wrote the conveying 
officer "Humanity demands a particular attention to the 
Situation of the Invalids, who have this day left this city 
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for west Point •.• and as you have the immediate charge of 
them while on the road, I have thought best to furnish you 
with the sum of forty dollars for the express purpose of 
procuring the wood necessary for cooking and comfortable 
lodging for the party under your comrnand." 258 
So the end came, quietly, to the Commissary General of 
Military Stores, or Ordnance, Department. The final 
American victory at Yorktown was a victory for Knox, Flower, 
Hodgdon, all the "voices from below" who, through dedication 









responsibilities, by forging effective relationships with 
his subordinates, Knox was able to achieve effective control 
over a "most intricate department." 
The men of the Ordnance Department, Hodgdon's gentlemen 
in black faced red, who dedicated themselves to making the 
military stores system work in spite of every type of 
shortage, succeeded in supplying the Continental Army with 
materials of victory. Their story has long been ignored by 
historians. The evidence supplied in this thesis, taken 
from sources previously little studied by historians, 
suggests that the old "rag, tag, and bobtail" image of the 
continental Army may be, at least in respect to Ordnance, 
due for a reexamination. The names of Benjamin Flower and 
samuel Hodgdon are not to be found in the American Parthenon 
of the Revolution among those of Washington, Jefferson or 
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Adams. But for them, who toiled behind the scenes in what 
must often have seemed hopeless and thankless tasks, it is 
doubtful if any of those we now call 11 heroes" would have 
been more than a brief and unnoticed flicker in the history 
of the British Empire. 
Nathanael Greene once remarked "who ever heard of a 
Quartermaster General in History? 11 There was no glory or 
rewards to be earned of the type men recognized from the 
staff duties necessary to an army. But Benjamin Flower best 
summed up the rewards of the little men who go unnoticed 
through history. In a letter to an armorer who was 
disappointed in not getting the coat to which he was 
entitled for his service, Flower wrote, "The Zeal and 
rntegri ty you have shown during a four years service in my 
department intitles you to every acknowledgement on my part, 
and a generous reward from the Publick--[however] ..• you will 
always have the pleasing consolation of having honestly 
aim' d at doing your duty, even if that compensation should 
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not be made to you as fully as you have a right to expect. 11 
APPENDIX A 
CONGRESSIONAL VOTE TO INDICT COL. FLOWER 
MONDAY, AUGUST 3, 1778 
"That Colonel Benjamin Flower, commissary general of 
military stores, be immediately arrested and closely confined in 
the gaol in this town:" 
To this amendment was moved, 
"That a member of this house be appointed forthwith to 
repair to the place where Cornelius Sweers, late deputy 
commissary of military stores, is confined, and to take the 
deposition of the said Cornelius Sweers, relative to the charge 
made by him against Colonel Benjamin Flower, for frauds in his 
office; and in case it should appear, on the deposition of the 
said Cornelius Sweers, that Colonel B. Flower is charged with 
frauds and malpractices in the discharge of his office, in such 
case notice be given to the Board of War, who are hereby ordered 
to arrest the said Benjamin Flower without delay, and to confine 
him in gaol, taking care to secure his money and effects, and all 
his papers of a public nature." 
On which amendment, the yeas and nays being required by Mr. 
[William] Duer, 
New Ham:eshire, Connecticut, 
Mr. Bartlett, no no Mr. Sherman, no 
Hosmer, no no 
Massachusetts Bay, A. Adams, no 
Mr. s. Adams, no no 
Dana, no no New York, 
Lovell, no Mr. Duer, ay 
Holten, no G. Morris, ay ay 
Rhode Island, North Carolina, 
Mr. Marchant, no no Mr. Penn, no no 
New Jersey, South Carolina, 
Mr. Scudder, no div. Mr. Laurens, ay Boudinot, ay Drayton, no div. Mathews, no 
Pennsylvania, Heyward, ay 
Mr. R. Morris ay ay 
Georgia, 
Maryland, Mr. Telfair, ay ay 
Mr. Chase, no 
Forbes, no no 
Plater, ay 
Virginia, 
Mr. R.H. Lee, ay 
Banister, ay ay 
T. Adams, ay 
Harvie, ay 
So it passed in the negative. 
Another amendment was moved in the words following: 
"Colonel Benjamin Flower, commissary general of military 
stores, being charged with mal-conduct in the execution of his 
office, 
"Ordered, that he be arrested and safely kept until the 
further order of Congress:" 
On the question to agree to this amendment, the yeas and 
nays being required by Mr. [Samuel] Case, 
New Hampshire, 
Mr. Bartlett, ay 
Massachusetts Bay, 





Mr. Marchant, ay 
Connecticut, 
Mr. Sherman, ay 
Hosmer, no 
A. Adams, ay 
Virginia, 
Mr. R.H. Lee, ay 
Banister, no 
T. Adams, ay 
Harvie, no 
North Carolina, 














































Ordered, That the Board of war carry into execution the 
foregoing order. 
Ordered, That the continental treasurer make no further 
payments of money to Colonel Benjamin Flower, or his order, upon 
any warrants heretofore granted, until farther order of Congress. 





KEY DEVELOPMENT CHRONOLOGY FOR 
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Committee appointed to investigate 
arms and military stores supply. 
Ezekiel Cheever appointed Commissary 
of Artillery Stores. 
Secret Committee of Trade established 
to import arms and stores. 
Cannon Committee established. 
Committee appointed to establish a 
War Office. 
Musket Committee established. 
Establish arms manufactory at Lancas-
ter, Pa., and a gun lock factory at 
Trenton, N.J. 
Establishment of a Board of War and 
Ordnance. 
Transfer Secret Committee of Trade 
Duties to Board of War. 
Knox submits "Hints" for improving 
United States Artillery. 
Establish magazine and laboratory at 
Carlisle, Pa. 
Benjamin Flower appointed Commissary 
General of Military Stores. 
All arms 
STATES." 
to be stamped "UNITED 
Samuel Hodgdon appointed 
Commissary of Military 
Northern Army. 
by Knox as 
Stores for 
washington requests all Military 
stores be placed under one person or 
body. 
1778 February 11 
1779 February 18 
First regulations for Military Stores 
or Ordnance Department. Confirms 
position of Commissary General of 
Military Stores and establishes du-
ties, staff, and pay levels: 
Corn. Gen. Mil. Stores -
Deputy Corn. Gen. Mil. 
Stores 
Corn. of Mil. Stores 






- $75/rno. and 
5 rations/day 
- $60/rno. and 
4 rations/day 
- $50/rno. and 
3 rations/day 
- $40/rno. and 
2 rations/day 
- $40/rno. and 
2 rations/day 
(Corn. Gen. receives forage 
horses per mo., all other 
forage for 1 horse.) 
for 2 
staff 
Second arrangement of Ordnance 
independent Department establishes 
field staff: 
Field Corn. Mil. Stores 




surveyor of Ordnance 
- $ 7 5 /rno • , $ 4 0 
subsistence 
and 1 ration 
- $60/rno., $30 
subsistence 
and 1 ration 
- $ 4 0 /rno • , $1 0 
subsistence 
and 1 ration 
- $40/rno., $10 
subsistence 
and 1 ration 












Departmental enlisted personnel 
allowed $10/rno. subsistence rather 
than food ration. 
Rather subsistence allowed 
February 18 arrangement, 
officers to be allowed: 
in 
field 
Field Commissary - $400/rno. 






Civil staff allowed 
rank. 
clothing but no 
Hodgdon directed from 
take "sole charge" 
Ordnance Department. 
main army to 
of Flower's 
Hodgdon appointed Deputy Commissary 
General of Military Stores at 
$1,250/mo. 
New pay arrangement and staff for 
Ordnance Department: 
l Com. Gen. Mil. Stores -
$360-$1,750/mo. 
l Deputy Com. Gen. Mil. Stores -
$240-$1,000/mo. 
l Commissary - Springfield, Mass. 
Carlisle, Penn. 
Virginia 
Deputies at subordinate posts. 
Laboratory established near Richmond, 
Virginia, under Captain Nathaniel 
Irish. 
January 12-31 New arrangements of Ordnance Depart-
ment: 
Corn. Gen. Mil. Stores 
Deputy Com. Gen. Mil. 
Stores 
\4 I 
- $115/mo. and 
3 rations 











Deputy Com. Mil. Stores 
Conductor 
Clerk 
Field Com. Mil. Stores 




Surveyor of Ordnance 
- $55/mo. and 
2 rations 
- $45/rno. and 
1 ration 
- $40/rno. and 
1 ration 
- $90/rno. and 
2 rations 
- $70/mo. and 
2 rations 
- $45/mo. and 
1 ration 
- $40/rno. and 
1 ration 
- $40/mo. 
Congress established Secretary at War 
and Superintendent of Finance. 
Colonel Flower dies. 
Hodgdon appointed new Commissary 
General of Military Stores. 
Last arrangement of Military Stores 
or Ordnance Department: Secretary at 
War head of Department. Commissary 
General abolished. 
Field Com. of Mil. 
Stores 
Deputy Field Com. of 
Mil. Stores for 
Southern Army 
Deputy Field Corn. of 
Mil. Stores for 
west Point 
\41., 
- $50/rno. and 
2 rations 
- $40/mo. and 
2 rations 
- $40/mo. and 
2 rations 
• 
1782 September 3 
L 
Conductor and Clerks 
established as: 
- $30/mo. and 
1 ration 
1 Field Com. and 2 clerks/conductors 
with Main Army 
1 Deputy Field Com. and 2 clerks at 
West Point and Southern Army 
1 Conductor at Fort Pitt 
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